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Enhanced Public Defense Improves Pretrial Outcomes and
Reduces Racial Disparities
PAUL HEATON*
Numerous jurisdictions are working to reform pretrial processes to reduce or
eliminate money bail and decrease pretrial detention. Although reforms such as the
abandonment of bail schedules or adoption of actuarial risk assessment tools have
been widely enacted, the role of defense counsel in the pretrial process has received
less attention.
This Article considers an approach to pretrial reform focused on improving the
quality of defense counsel. In Philadelphia, a substantial fraction of people facing
criminal charges are detained following rapid preliminary hearings where initial
release conditions are set by bail magistrates operating with limited information.
Beginning in 2017, the Defender Association of Philadelphia implemented a pilot
program wherein “bail advocates” interviewed defendants shortly after arrest to
collect individualized information that could be used to more effectively argue for
pretrial release.
Using administrative data covering nearly 100,000 criminal cases and a quasiexperimental research design that exploits the random shuffling of arraignment shifts
covered by advocates during the pilot, we measure the causal impacts of the
advocates on pretrial release, failure to appear, case outcomes, and future crime.
Bail advocates did not reduce detention rates (at least on average) but did
substantially reduce clients’ likelihood of bail violation (-64%) and future arrest (26%). Bail advocates also reduce racial disparities in pretrial detention. Interviews
with prosecutors, defenders, and bail advocates suggest that these impacts likely
represent both better understanding of defendant risk and needs by magistrates and
a better sense of procedural justice by defendants.
These results suggest that bail advocates might achieve a key objective desired
by proponents of risk assessment tools—the provision of better information to
pretrial decisionmakers—without triggering comparable concerns. A workable
solution to the problem of improving pretrial outcomes may lie with an old mainstay
of the criminal process—the defense attorney.

* Senior Fellow, University of Pennsylvania Law School and Academic Director,
Quattrone Center for the Fair Administration of Justice. I express appreciation to Mark
Houldin of the Defender Association of Philadelphia for overseeing the pilot and Aaron Siegel
for facilitating data collection. Emily Lubin provided exceptional assistance with the
interviews, and Megan Stevenson provided invaluable help in conceptualizing the project.
Sarah Allen, John Gross, Ross Miller, and seminar participants at the University of
Pennsylvania and the Duke Center for Science and Justice provided helpful comments on
drafts of the project. This work is solely the responsibility of the author and does not reflect
the views of the Defender Association or any other agency or entity.
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INTRODUCTION
There is a growing consensus across both the political left and right regarding the
need to reduce the U.S. incarceration rate, which stands above that of all other
developed countries in the world and at nearly three times the rate it was in 1980.1
Conservatives decry the enormous taxpayer costs of this system of mass
incarceration along with the considerable imposition it places on human liberty,
while progressives emphasize racial and other inequities in the system and the harms
it inflicts on disadvantaged populations.
In seeking to roll back the U.S. incarceration rate, reformers have seized upon
pretrial reform as a particular area of opportunity.2 Nationally, individuals in pretrial
custody represent 65% of the overall jail population,3 meaning that lowering pretrial
detention can have an appreciable impact on overall incarceration rates. A growing
body of high-quality research links pretrial detention to later adverse outcomes,
including unemployment and recidivism,4 implying that pretrial reform can

1. John Gramlich, America’s Incarceration Rate Is at a Two-Decade Low, PEW RES.
CTR. (May 2, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/05/02/Americasincarceration-rate-is-at-a-two-decade-low/ [https://perma.cc/79EY-PQMW].
2. See generally Samuel R. Wiseman, Bail and Mass Incarceration, 52 GA. L. REV. 235
(2018).
3. ZHEN ZENG, U.S. DEP’T JUST., JAIL INMATES IN 2017 1 (APR. 2019).
4. See Paul Heaton, The Expansive Reach of Pretrial Detention, 98 N.C. L. REV. 369
(2020) for a summary of this literature.
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potentially generate both short run benefits in the form of reduced incarceration costs
and longer run benefits as cases resolve differently. Moreover, pretrial detention is a
clear driver of race- and wealth-based disparities in the criminal justice system,5
meaning that reforms in this area offer the potential to improve equity within the
system. Responding to these realities, within the past three years numerous states,
including New York, New Jersey, New Mexico, California, Texas, and Kentucky,
have enacted or considered significant changes to rules governing pretrial detention,6
as have many of the nation’s largest cities and counties.7
While there is widespread enthusiasm for pretrial reform, there remains
considerable debate as to how pretrial systems should be changed in actual practice.
Proposals for reform have considered a wide range of alternatives, including
eliminating cash bail, speeding up the trial process, modifying constitutional or
procedural rules to limit eligibility for pretrial detention, providing supportive
services to charged persons, and removing individuals from the system altogether
through diversion. This Article describes and evaluates an intervention focused on
defense attorneys, one component of the system that has arguably received
insufficient attention within the pretrial reform movement.
In Philadelphia, as in many jurisdictions, initial pretrial release decisions are made
in brief hearings that include little contextualized information about the defendant.
Beginning in April 2017, the Defender Association of Philadelphia launched a pilot
program that hired “bail advocates” who met with people facing criminal charges
shortly after arrest and prior to the initial bail hearing.8 The bail advocates collected
information about these individuals and their cases, familiarized them with the
pretrial process, and linked them to not only their family members and friends during
their initial holding period, but also to a larger cluster of services offered by the
Defender Association and community partners.9 A key objective of the program was
to furnish defenders staffing the pretrial hearings with more individualized
information about clients, which could be used to argue for less stringent pretrial
release conditions.
The Defender Association shuffled the dates on which the bail advocates were
available to take cases, creating quasi-experimental variation that allows us to
rigorously measure the causal impacts of having a bail advocate on criminal justice
outcomes. Using administrative data covering nearly 100,000 criminal cases in

5. David Arnold, Will Dobbie & Crystal S. Yang, Racial Bias in Bail Decisions, 133 Q.
J. ECON. 1885, 1885–86, 1889–90 (2018); JOHN M. MACDONALD & ELLEN A.
DONNELLY, EVALUATING THE ROLE OF RACE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADJUDICATIONS IN
DELAWARE 3–4 (2016), https://courts.delaware.gov/supreme/docs/DE_DisparityReport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8KV8-7APX].
6. CHERISE FANNO BURDEEN, PRETRIAL JUST. INST., THE STATE OF PRETRIAL JUSTICE IN
AMERICA 4, 6, 8, 13, 14 (2017).
7. Shima Baradaran Baughman, Dividing Bail Reform, 105 IOWA L. REV. 947, 949
(2020).
8. KEIR BRADFORD-GREY, DEF. ASS’N PHILA., PHILADAELPHIA CITY COUNCIL BUDGET
TESTIMONY 7–8 (2017), http://phlcouncil.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/DefenderAssociation-City-Council-Testimony-FY18-FINAL-VERSION.pdf [https://perma.cc/HXY695Z3].
9. Id.
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Philadelphia, this Article demonstrates that the bail advocates did not affect release
decisions on average but did substantially reduce clients’ incidence of bail violation
(-64%) and both pretrial (-41%) and overall future crime (-26%). These gains are
comparable to those achievable using state-of-the-art risk assessment instruments.
Bail advocates also lessen punishment, reducing the likelihood clients will need to
resolve their cases by pleading guilty or engaging in court-mandated remedial
activities.
Importantly, the results also suggest that bail advocates reduce racial disparities
in pretrial detention. In Philadelphia, 59% of people facing criminal charges are
Black, yet 66% of defendants who are detained pretrial are Black. The estimates in
this study suggest that, other things being equal, if bail advocates were available to
all people facing criminal charges, only 58% of pretrial detainees would be Black,
thereby eliminating the increase in disparity observed due to pretrial detention. Bail
advocates thus provide one of the first examples of a pretrial intervention shown to
reduce disparities in an experimental evaluation.
Interviews conducted with numerous bail advocates, public defenders,
prosecutors, and supervisory personnel were used to better understand the
mechanisms through which the bail advocates generate these impacts.10
Interviewees—who were blinded to the results of the empirical analysis—widely
believed that the advocates affected how magistrates decided cases, and those with
firsthand experience in bail hearings cited specific examples of cases where the
advocates’ information led to a different bail outcome. That bail advocates affected
magistrates’ decision-making in at least some cases is also supported by ancillary
statistical analyses that demonstrate that advocates increase the average amount of
time magistrates spend on the hearing, and that the causal effect of the bail advocates
varies across individual magistrates.
Interviewees identified another channel of impact, one that might not be achieved
by other pretrial reforms. Interviewees posited that, by siding with people facing
criminal charges—many of whom had no prior experience in the criminal justice
system—at a moment of particular vulnerability, explaining the process, calling
family members, and encouraging future contacts between defendants and their
attorneys, the bail advocates increased their clients’ sense of procedural justice11,
which fostered better engagement throughout the adjudication process. Such an
effect would be consistent with prior research demonstrating that supportive pretrial
interventions can increase defendants’ sense of fairness regarding the process and
intention to comply with the court.12 Moreover, the magnitude of the decrease in
arrests and the finding that the bail advocates reduced defendants’ ultimate
punishment in their cases are difficult to explain if bail advocates only enable
magistrates to better select less risky subjects for release. However, these findings
are consistent with an environment where bail advocates alter some individuals’

10. We attempted to interview the bail magistrates, but they declined to participate. See
infra Part V.
11. See infra note 136.
12. Douglas L. Colbert, Ray Paternoster & Shawn Bushway, Do Attorneys Really Matter?
The Empirical and Legal Case for the Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1719,
1720 (2002).
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underlying behavior to become more engaged with their attorneys and more
compliant with court requirements, as posited by the interviewees.
Defense-oriented interventions to improve the pretrial process could prove
attractive for a variety of reasons. As one method of reform, many jurisdictions have
recently implemented pretrial actuarial risk assessment instruments (ARAI), which
use statistical analysis of large datasets to predict the likelihood that a particular
person facing criminal charges will fail to appear (FTA) or engage in pretrial crime
as a function of characteristics such as age, prior criminal history, charge, and prior
bail violations. However, ARAIs have proven politically controversial, and a number
of jurisdictions, most notably California, have recently rejected reforms that expand
the use of pretrial risk assessments.13
Improving the quality of representation at first appearance seems to achieve one
of the primary goals of those calling for the implementation of ARAIs—namely,
providing more individualized information about defendant risk to courts—while
simultaneously fulfilling a key goal of ARAIs’ opponents—allowing people facing
criminal charges to better access supportive services that reduce future contact with
the criminal justice system. Moreover, defense-focused solutions likely do not raise
the same concerns regarding net widening, racial bias, or non-transparency that have
animated opponents of ARAIs. Additionally, in most jurisdictions, improvements to
defense representation could be achieved without substantial changes to existing
court procedures or rules, so there are potentially fewer veto points for reform. And
such improvements could be implemented in concert with other changes, including,
where desired, ARAIs. While there are also important limits to defense-centric
interventions—several of which are discussed below—overall these results suggest
that solutions focused on improving the quality of defense representation at the
earliest stages of the process deserve a more prominent place in the larger discussion
around pretrial reform.
These findings carry import for current legal doctrines regarding the right to
counsel. Current caselaw extends the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to “critical
stages”14 of the prosecution, but the Supreme Court has not definitively indicated
whether the bail determination itself qualifies as a critical stage.15 Although many
lower courts recognize bail hearings as a critical stage,16 this recognition is not
universal.17 These quasi-experimental results indicate that the quality of counsel at
the initial bail hearing has a direct impact on the outcome of a case and sentence. In

13. Maria Dinzeo, Bid to End Cash Bail System Fails in California, COURTHOUSE NEWS
SERV. (Nov. 4, 2020), https://www.courthousenews.com/bid-to-end-cash-bail-system-failsin-california/ [https://perma.cc/7WB6-TG84].
14. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237 (1967).
15. Alexander Bunin, The Constitutional Right to Counsel at Bail Hearings, 31 CRIM.
JUST. 23, 23–24 (2016); Charlie Gerstein, Note, Plea Bargaining and the Right to Counsel at
Bail Hearings, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1513, 1514 (2013).
16. See, e.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 12 (1970); State v. Fann, 571 A.2d 1023,
1030 (N.J. 1990); Ditch v. Grace, 479 F.3d 249, 253 (3d Cir. 2007); Hurrell-Harring v. State,
930 N.E.2d 217, 223 (N.Y. 2010); Gonzalez v. Commissioner of Correction, 68 A.3d 624,
632 (Conn. 2013); Booth v. Galveston County, 352 F. Supp. 3d. 718, 738 (S.D. Tex. 2019).
17. See, e.g., State ex rel. Harold F. Ashland v. Ralph Tahash, 123 N.W.2d 325, 326
(Minn. 1963); Padgett v. State, 590 P.2d 432, 436 (Alaska 1979).
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Gerstein v. Pugh, the Supreme Court indicated that critical stages include “pretrial
procedures that would impair defense on the merits if the accused is required to
proceed without counsel.”18 Under this formulation and in light of these findings, it
seems apparent that a bail setting should qualify as a critical stage where a there is a
right to effective counsel.
It is likely that multiple solutions will be required to correct the problems of
current pretrial systems, and defense attorneys are no panacea. Nevertheless, whereas
there has been much public discussion of algorithmic solutions to improve pretrial
decisions,19 the findings of this Article offer a person-focused path towards pretrial
reform that centers on the defense attorney.
I. PRETRIAL REFORM AND THE APPEAL OF ACTUARIAL TOOLS
Pretrial reform has emerged as a key component of the larger criminal justice
reform movement in the United States. As of March 2019, reforms had been recently
initiated in thirty-seven of fifty states,20 and public support for limits to pretrial
detention remains robust.21 Several features of the pretrial process have rendered
reforms of this part of the system more politically viable than broader, more
comprehensive sentencing reforms. During the pretrial phase, criminal defendants
maintain the legal presumption of innocence, allowing politicians to advocate for
pretrial reform without appearing soft on crime. Moreover, because pretrial detention
generally occurs in local jails, there is also better incentive alignment between those
making pretrial detention decisions—local prosecutors and magistrates—and those
who benefit from a reduced jail population.22 The reform movement has also been
fueled by a number of recent court decisions identifying constitutional infirmities in
common procedures for setting and enforcing bail,23 which has spurred some

18. 420 U.S. 103, 122 (1975).
19. See e.g., Zhiyuan “Jerry” Lin, Jongbin Jung, Sharad Goel & Jennifer Skeem, In the
U.S. Criminal Justice System, Algorithms Help Officials Make Better Decisions, Our Research
Finds, WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics
/2020/03/02/us-criminal-justice-system-algorithms-do-help-officials-make-better-decisionsour-research-finds/ [https://perma.cc/3BHA-4J38].
20. PRETRIAL JUST. INST., WHAT’S HAPPENING IN PRETRIAL JUSTICE? 21 (2019),
https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?Document
FileKey=8b92b61e-a386-577f-5b04-5cafce80a96d&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/RT7RY69Z].
21. Americans Favor Expanded Pretrial Release, Limited Use of Jail, PEW CHARITABLE
TRS. (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2018
/11/americans-favor-expanded-pretrial-release-limited-use-of-jail [https://perma.cc/Z4HYEZKR].
22. See Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Rationing Criminal Justice, 116
MICH. L. REV. 187, 221–22 (2017).
23. See, e.g., O’Donnell v. Harris County, 892 F.3d 147, 163 (5th Cir. 2018); Caliste v.
Cantrell, 937 F.3d 525, 532 (5th Cir. 2019); Dixon v. City of St. Louis, No. 4:19-CV-0112AGF, 2019 WL 2509792, at *1–*2 (E.D. Mo. June 11, 2019); Daves v. Dallas County, 341 F.
Supp. 3d 688, 695 (N.D. Tex. 2018).
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jurisdictions to engage in reform efforts to defend against the possibility of future
litigation.24
The movement to reform pretrial processes and end cash bail has coincided with
a proliferation of interest in using “big data” and artificial intelligence to address
problems in business and government.25 While scientists and scholars have
contemplated numerous applications of such technologies to the criminal justice
system,26 perhaps no aspect of the system is as natural of a fit as the problem of bail
setting, which is a quintessential classification problem. Bail setting has long been
conceptualized by scholars and practitioners as a risk assessment exercise that
requires classifying defendants based on their likelihood of failure to appear for court
and setting release conditions accordingly;27 in recent years the technologies for
solving such classification problems have advanced tremendously. Unsurprisingly,
these technological advances have spurred widespread efforts to incorporate more
advanced actuarial approaches for assessing risk into the pretrial process.28 Spurred
in part by efforts of the Laura and John Arnold Foundation to develop and
disseminate an evidence-based pretrial ARAI called the Public Safety Assessment
(PSA),29 today numerous jurisdictions provide bail decisionmakers with outputs

24. See, e.g., Jolie McCullough, Harris County Agreed to Reform Bail Practices That
Keep Poor People in Jail. Will it Influence Other Texas Counties?, TEX. TRIB. (July 31, 2019,
3:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2019/07/31/harris-county-bail-settlement-dallastexas/ [https://perma.cc/5WCN-WHW6]; Adam Tamburin, Inside the Effort to Change
(Dec.
12,
2017,
6:10
PM),
Nashville
Bail
System,
TENNESSEAN
https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/2017/12/12/nashville-cash-bail-system-reformlawsuit/920049001/ [https://perma.cc/D8FL-8W52]; Scott Huddleston & Elizabeth Zavala,
County Contracts with San Antonio to Magistrate its Inmates over District Judges’ Objections,
SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (Apr. 24, 2019, 3:08 PM), https://www.expressnews.com/news
/local/article/County-contracts-with-San-Antonio-to-magistrate-13791686.php [https://perma
.cc/V2KJ-G9NQ].
25. See Susan Athey, Beyond Prediction: Using Big Data for Policy Problems, 355 SCI.
483 (2017).
26. See Stephen E. Henderson, A Few Criminal Justice Big Data Rules: Round Table on
Big Data and Criminal Law, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 527, 531, 533 (2018); Ric Simmons,
Quantifying Criminal Procedure: How to Unlock the Potential of Big Data in Our Criminal
Justice System, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 947, 993 (2016).
27. See, e.g., ARTHUR L. BEELEY, THE BAIL SYSTEM IN CHICAGO (1927); Wayne R.
LaFave, Alternatives to the Present Bail System: Proceedings of the Conference on Bail and
Indigency, U. ILL. L.F. 8 (1965).
28. There is a large development of scholarly literature on risk assessment tools in the
criminal justice system; for a recent primer, see SARAH L. DESMARAIS & EVAN M. LOWDER,
PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT TOOLS: A PRIMER FOR JUDGES, PROSECUTORS, AND DEFENSE
ATTORNEYS (2019), https://www.safetyandjusticechallenge.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02
/Pretrial-Risk-Assessment-Primer-February-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9DT-DF87].
29. Pretrial Risk Assessment Now Available to All Interested Jurisdictions; Research
Advisory Board Announced, ARNOLD VENTURES (July 11, 2018), https://www.arnoldventures
.org/newsroom/laura-and-john-arnold-foundation-makes-pretrial-risk-assessment-availableto-all-jurisdictions-announces-expert-panel-to-serve-as-pretrial-research-advisory-board/
[https://perma.cc/6UHC-WRAJ].
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from an actuarial risk assessment instrument that can be considered when
determining pretrial release conditions.30
Actuarial tools offer a solution to a key political problem facing those who
advocate shrinking the pretrial system’s footprint: releasing more defendants, absent
any other changes to the system, will mechanically lead to increases in FTA or
pretrial crime due to reverse incapacitation. While expanding pretrial release remains
popular with the general public, members of the public also express concern about
pretrial misconduct and endorse pretrial detention when doing so would seemingly
prevent violent crime.31 Policymakers must balance the potential benefits of
liberalizing pretrial release with concerns about the possibility that some newly
released defendant might commit a high-profile offense that erodes their political
support.32
ARAIs offer a solution to this problem by promising to reduce the underlying
rates of FTA and pretrial crime by better sorting defendants. ARAIs are commonly
described as permitting the identification of “low risk” individuals who might
otherwise be detained under a cash bail system who can then be released without
posing a threat to public safety.33 By pairing adoption of ARAIs with proposals to
reduce or eliminate cash bail or otherwise liberalize pretrial release, policymakers
have sought to neutralize concerns that moving away from bail-based systems will
lead to an uptick in crime or FTA. Proponents also point to the tools’ potential to
bring greater accuracy, transparency, and uniformity to the process of determining

30. Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 508–10 (2018)
(describing some of the most common actuarial tools used in the pretrial arena).
31. See PRETRIAL JUST. INST., supra note 20; NEW SURVEY: With Increased
Understanding of Current Practices, Americans Support Reforms to Pretrial and Money Bail
Systems, PRETRIAL JUST. INST. (July 12, 2018), https://www.pretrial.org/new-survey-withincreased-understanding-of-current-practices-americans-support-reforms-to-pretrial-andmoney-bail-systems/ [https://perma.cc/75HE-E3X6].
32. See Brittany Taylor, Teen Accused of Shooting HPD Officer During Crime Spree Was
Out on Bond, CLICK2HOUSTON.COM, (Sept. 15, 2019, 5:01 PM), https://www.click2houston
.com/news/local/teen-accused-of-shooting-hpd-officer-during-crime-spree-was-out-on-bond
[https://perma.cc/EB8R-QV5B]; Cleve R. Wootson Jr., Chris Christie Claimed a Reform Was
‘Good Government.’ A Grieving Mother Says It Killed Her Son, WASH. POST (Aug. 5, 2017,
8:30
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/08/05/why-agrieving-mother-blames-chris-christie-for-her-sons-killing/ [https://perma.cc/XJ67-XZVY].
33. See, e.g., Sarah Cwiek, Judges in Five Michigan Courtrooms Are Using Risk
Assessments to Decide Bond, MICH. RADIO: NPR (Feb. 16, 2019), https://www.michiganradio
.org/post/judges-five-michigan-courtrooms-are-using-risk-assessments-decide-bond [https://
perma.cc/V3JS-76UB]; Stephanie Wykstra, Bail Reform, Which Could Save Millions of
Unconvicted People from Jail, Explained, VOX (Oct. 17, 2018, 7:30 AM),
https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/17/17955306/bail-reform-criminal-justiceinequality [https://perma.cc/ZVJ2-GTAP]; Erin Hassanzadeh, Minneapolis Mayor Frey
Proposes End to Cash Bail System for Low-Level Offenders, CBS MINN. (Sept. 18, 2019, 6:47
PM), https://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2019/09/18/minneapolis-mayor-frey-proposes-end-tocash-bail-system-for-low-level-offenders/ [https://perma.cc/9KHR-MYER]; The Editorial
Board, Why Texas Bail Reform Makes Us Safer, HOUS. CHRON. (Feb. 13, 2019, 10:04 PM),
https://www.houstonchronicle.com/opinion/editorials/article/Why-reforming-Texas-bailreform-makes-us-safer-13614816.php [https://perma.cc/N5UD-9RMT].
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pretrial release conditions and argue that ARAIs can increase racial equity in the
system by correcting explicit or implicit bias of criminal justice decisionmakers.34
However, as more jurisdictions have come to embrace ARAIs, the tools have
come under increasing criticism from both scholars35 and activist groups.36 For
example, recently over 100 civil rights groups, including the ACLU, Color of
Change, and the NAACP have called for their exclusion from the pretrial process,37
and a prominent provider of pretrial technical services reversed its position
supporting ARAIs.38 Opponents express concerns that, by labeling some defendants
“high risk,” ARAIs can be used to widen the pretrial net and increase the use of
preventative detention.39 They further contend that ARAIs are likely to embed racial
bias in the pretrial process,40 both because the tools themselves can treat racial groups
disparately, and because the underlying data used to train the instruments are
produced through a racially biased process.41 They also cite an emerging body of
empirical research suggesting that ARAIs, whatever their desirable theoretical
attributes, do not necessarily generate lasting reductions in pretrial detention or racial
disparities when actually implemented.42 Finally, they criticize the tools for being

34. GIDEON’S PROMISE, NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEF. ASSOC., NAT’L ASSOC. FOR PUB. DEF.,
NAT’L ASSOC. OF CRIM. DEF. LAWS. & AM. COUNCIL CHIEF DEF., JOINT STATEMENT: PRETRIAL
RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS (2019), https://www.nacdl.org/getattachment/c80216bf84e0-429d-9750-9e49f502913d/joint-statement-on-pretrial-risk-assessment-instrumentsmarch-2019-.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5YG-5WFF]; see also NAT’L ASSOC. OF PRETRIAL SERVS.
AGENCIES, STANDARDS ON PRETRIAL RELEASE: REVISED 2020, https://drive.google.com/file/d
/1edS2bltwfNROieGeu1A6qKIuTfzqop92/view [https://perma.cc/BM79-4QYM].
35. See, e.g., Letter from Colin Doyle, Chelsea Barabas & Karthik Dinakar to L.A. Cnty.
Bd. of Supervisors (July 17, 2019), https://dam-prod.media.mit.edu/x/2019/07/17/Los
%20Angeles.pdf?source=post_page [https://perma.cc/W93X-Y9RH].
36. See e.g., The Use of Pretrial "Risk Assessment" Instruments: A Shared Statement of
Civil Rights Concerns, CIVIL RIGHTS.ORG, http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/criminal-justice
/Pretrial-Risk-Assessment-Full.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PMM-69F3].
37. Id.
38. UPDATED POSITION ON PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT TOOLS, PRETRIAL JUST. INST.
(2020), https://www.pretrial.org/wp-content/uploads/Risk-Statement-PJI-2020.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/QGJ2-2TNU].
39. John Logan Koepke & David G. Robinson, Danger Ahead: Risk Assessment and the
Future of Bail Reform, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1725, 1782–85 (2018).
40. See Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218 (2019) for a nuanced
discussion of this issue.
41. The Use of Pretrial "Risk Assessment" Instruments, supra note 36, at 1; Wykstra,
supra note 33.
42. See, e.g., Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in Action, 103 MINN. L. REV.
303, 369–74 (2018); Carly Will Sloan, George S. Naufal & Heather Caspers, The Effect of
Risk Assessment Scores on Judicial Behavior and Defendant Outcomes 24–25 (IZA Inst. of
Lab. Econs. Discussion Paper, Working Paper No. 11948, 2018); CINDY REDCROSS, BRIT
HENDERSON, LUKE MIRATIX & ERIN VALENTINE, EVALUATION OF PRETRIAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
REFORMS THAT USE THE PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT: EFFECTS IN MECKLENBURG COUNTY,
NORTH CAROLINA (2019).
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insufficiently transparent.43
Although united in opposition to ARAIs, the critics of these tools have achieved
less consensus in delineating what, if anything, should be used instead to improve
the pretrial process.44 Some critics simply recite the drawbacks of ARAIs and call
for more widespread pretrial release without proposing anything to address concerns
about pretrial crime or nonappearance.45 Among those who do propose alternatives,
common proposals include expansions of pretrial monitoring, text reminders,46 and
rides to court.47 Text reminders, while promising, have a mixed record of success in
addressing FTA,48 while rides to court have yet to be rigorously evaluated, and both
solutions address FTA rather than pretrial crime, which is the issue of much greater
public concern. Expanded pretrial monitoring carries the potential to address pretrial
crime,49 but raises concerns similar to ARAIs regarding net widening and racial
bias.50 And none of the proposed alternatives have been demonstrated to provably
reduce racial disparities, a key concern with present pretrial systems.

43. Sharad Goel, Ravi Shroff, Jennifer Skeem & Christopher Slobogin, The Accuracy,
Equity, and Jurisprudence of Criminal Risk Assessment 1, 15 (Dec. 26, 2018) (unpublished
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3306723 [https://perma.cc
/U8RJ-47SB].
44. Arvind Dilawar, What Should Replace Cash Bail?, PAC. STANDARD (Apr. 9, 2019),
https://psmag.com/social-justice/what-should-replace-cash-bail
[https://perma.cc/QK6VUJT9].
45. See, e.g., Jocelyn Simonson, Opinion, The Danger of ‘Dangerousness’: Bail Reform
that Relies on This Slippery Notion Will Lock up Many More Black and Brown People Pretrial,
DAILY NEWS (Mar. 10, 20202), https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-oped-danger-ofdangerousness-20200310-33jydlhfr5dtvbuq62j4t3ehz4-story.html
[https://perma.cc/JFF5UULV].
46. See, e.g., Brook Hopkins, Chiraag Bains & Colin Doyle, Principles of Pretrial
Release: Reforming Bail Without Repeating Its Harms, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 679,
682 (2019); Memorandum from Stephanos Bibas, Emily Owens, David Rudovsky & Sandra
Mayson to the Subcommittee on Fairness in the Adult Criminal Justice System, Delaware
Access to Justice Commission, Improving Fairness and Addressing Racial Disparities in the
Delaware Criminal Justice System (Sept. 2015), https://courts.delaware.gov/supreme/docs
/QuattroneCenterMemorandumDERacialDisparities.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9QT-5SYU].
47. Miguel Otárola, Minneapolis Seeks Alternative to Cash Bail for Low-Level Crimes,
STAR TRIB. (Sept. 18, 2019, 9:01 PM), http://www.startribune.com/minneapolis-seeksalternative-to-cash-bail-for-low-level-crimes/560730682/ [https://perma.cc/6GA9-S2KQ].
48. See BRYCE COOKE, BINTA ZAHRA DIOP, ALISSA FISHBANE, JONATHAN HAYES,
AURELIE OUSS & ANUJ SHAH, USING BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE TO IMPROVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
OUTCOMES: PREVENTING FAILURES TO APPEAR IN COURT (2018), https://www.ideas42.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/03/Using-Behavioral-Science-to-Improve-Criminal-Justice-Outcomes
.pdf [https://perma.cc/RX7S-ES7Z]; Alan J. Tomkins, Brian Bornstein, Mitchel N. Herian,
David I. Rosenbaum & Elizabeth M. Neeley, An Experiment in the Law: Studying a Technique
to Reduce Failure to Appear in Court, 48 CT. REV. 96, 96–97 (2012); Christopher T.
Lowenkamp, Alexander M. Holsinger & Tim Dierks, Assessing the Effects of Court Date
Notifications Within Pretrial Case Processing, 43 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 167, 173–74 (2017).
49. See JOSEPHINE W. HAHN, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, AN EXPERIMENT IN BAIL
REFORM: EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF THE BROOKLYN SUPERVISED RELEASE PROGRAM 19
(2016).
50. See Michelle Alexander, Opinion, The Newest Jim Crow, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2018),
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Opponents of ARAIs have also called for expanded access to broader supportive
services, such as housing, employment, and health care, for pretrial populations, but
such approaches raise considerable political, resource, and implementation
challenges. Moreover, the effects of such general investments of this sort on the
specific problems targeted by the pretrial system—FTA and pretrial crime—remain
poorly understood.
The paucity of evidence-based alternatives to ARAIs creates a dilemma for
proponents of pretrial reform—embracing risk assessment tools strikes many as
problematic, yet ARIAs seem to be an effective way to assuage fears about increasing
FTA and pretrial crime, which often must be addressed to enact reform. What appears
to be needed are new, evidence-based approaches that achieve similar goals and
objectives of ARAIs—facilitating the release of low-risk individuals and managing
the increase in pretrial crime that might ensue if fewer people facing criminal charges
are detained—without triggering the same concerns. Below we explore one such
potential solution centered on a component of the pretrial system that has received
less attention—the defense attorney—and provide rigorous evidence establishing its
effectiveness.
II. THE PHILADELPHIA PRETRIAL PROCESS AND PRIOR EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
A. The Bail Process in Philadelphia
Philadelphia’s bail process shares features in common with many large
jurisdictions—namely, a significant role for cash bail, use of an advisory bail
schedule, and reliance on rapid, cursory hearings to make initial bail decisions
followed up by an opportunity for more in-depth bail hearings for a subset of
defendants. Following arrest, criminal defendants are transported to one of five
booking facilities within the city,51 where they are fingerprinted and interviewed via
video or in person by pretrial services staff who obtain information about financial
resources, community ties, physical and mental conditions, and substance use for
inclusion in a pretrial services report.52 They are detained until a preliminary
arraignment, which combines a probable cause hearing with an initial bail
determination and occurs within forty-eight hours of arrest.53 Preliminary
arraignments occur twenty-four hours a day and are organized into three shifts: 7
a.m.–3 p.m., 3 p.m.–11 p.m., and 11 p.m.–7 a.m.

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/08/opinion/sunday/criminal-justice-reforms-racetechnology.html [https://perma.cc/GDU9-YXGW].
51. Memorandum at 13, City of Phila. v. Sessions, 309 F. Supp. 3d 289 (E.D. Pa. 2018)
aff'd in part, vacated in part sub nom. City of Phila. v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 916 F.3d 276
(3d Cir. 2019) (No. 17-3894).
52. See Neilay Shah, Criminal Justice Explainer: How Bail Works in Philadelphia, BILLY
PENN (May 20, 2018, 10:30 AM), https://billypenn.com/2018/05/20/criminal-justiceexplainer-how-bail-works-in-philadelphia/ [https://perma.cc/U7HE-C8J5].
53. PHILA. BAIL FUND & PENNSYLVANIANS FOR MODERN COURTS, PHILADELPHIA BAIL
WATCH REPORT: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON 611 BAIL HEARINGS 11 (Oct.
15, 2018), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/591a4fd51b10e32fb50fbc73/t/5bc60034a42
22f8cd2231c54/ [https://perma.cc/3ZHF-TYDG].
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Preliminary arraignments are conducted via video conference, with arraignment
court magistrates—commonly referred to as bail commissioners—presiding and
defendants participating remotely.54 Representatives from the district attorney (DA)
and public defender (PD) are present in the room with the bail commissioner,55 but,
absent unusual circumstances, have not interacted with the defendant prior to the start
of a hearing. Typical hearings last only a few minutes.56 Defendants often do not
speak during the hearings other than in response to questions, and in some cases are
counseled not to speak by the PD representative, presumably out of a concern that
they might make incriminating statements. After charges are read, bail magistrates
review the arresting officer’s report and the pretrial services report (which includes
information about prior criminal history), consult a grid of recommended bail
amounts,57 and consider any arguments made by the DA or PD representatives before
deciding whether pretrial release is appropriate and, if so, under what conditions.
Only in very rare cases in which defendants secured the services of counsel prior to
or immediately after arrest would an attorney other than the PD representative be
present to advocate on the defendant’s behalf.58
Bail commissioners have several options regarding release. Release options that
do not require money up front include release on recognizance, release with
nonmonetary conditions,59 or release with unsecured bond.60 Slightly more than half
of defendants in our sample are assigned money bail, in which case they must post
10% of the bail amount in order to be released. Atypical relative to other cities, in
Philadelphia money bail is administrated by the courts and commercial sureties play
a minimal role. Preventative detention is authorized by Pennsylvania law,61 and in
rare cases defendants are detained without bail. In our sample, roughly 30% of
defendants are detained until the completion of their case, some due to inability to
pay money bail.
At the preliminary arraignment, indigent defendants are assigned to the Defender
Association or private appointed counsel. Those clients unable to post bail following
the preliminary arraignment can have their bail reviewed later in the criminal

54. Id. at 13.
55. Neither these representatives nor the bail commissioners are required to be licensed,
practicing attorneys. Id. at 14.
56. Letter from Mary Catherine Roper & Nyssa Taylor, ACLU of Pa., to Hon. Sheila
Woods-Skipper, President Judge, First Judicial District, & Hon. Marsha N. Neifeld, President
Judge, Philadelphia Mun. Court 8 (Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.aclupa.org/sites/default/files
/legacy/3215/3839/7345/ACLU_Letter_to_FJD_regarding_Bail.pdf [https://perma.cc/4APK4JLC].
57. Philadelphia Bail Guidelines Grid, PHILA COURTS.US (Sept. 12, 2012),
https://www.courts.phila.gov/pdf/criminal-reports/Bail-Guildelines-Matrix.pdf [https://perma
.cc/88CR-8XH8].
58. See PHILA. BAIL FUND & PENNSYLVANIANS FOR MODERN COURTS, supra note 53, at
14.
59. For example, compliance with a stay-away order or supervision by the First Judicial
District’s Pretrial Services Division.
60. Report of the Special Master at 8 n.7, Phila. Cmty. Bail Fund v. Arraignment Ct.
Magistrates, No. 21 EM 2019 (Pa. Dec. 16, 2019).
61. PA. CONST. art. I, § 14.
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process,62 and bail can also be reviewed on motion of the defense attorney. Bail can
also be revoked on motion by the DA, or when defendants are rearrested while their
case is pending or fail to appear for court. Approximately 6% of defendants in our
sample experience bail forfeitures or revocations during their case.
To summarize, the initial bail determination is made at a preliminary arraignment
where the bail commissioner, defense counsel representative, and prosecutor
representative need not be trained attorneys; there is very limited information
available about the defendant or circumstances of the alleged crime; defendants
participate little; and decisions are usually made within the space of two or three
minutes.63
B. The Bail Advocates Pilot
Beginning in April 2017, the Defender Association piloted a new program
designed to enhance the ability of the public defender representative to advocate on
behalf of defendants’ interests at the preliminary arraignment. The advocates pilot
began with two advocates operating on selected day (7 a.m.–3 p.m.) shifts out of the
city’s Police Detention Unit (PDU), which is its largest booking facility. New
advocates rotated in during the summer of 2018.
One key drawback of the normal process is that defendants are not able to speak
to the PD representative prior to the hearing, meaning that PD representatives have
little factual basis at the time of a hearing to advocate for a particular disposition. If,
for example, the defendant is unable to afford bail beyond a certain amount, or there
are mitigating factors, such as possible adverse impacts on employment or family
members that might militate in favor of release, traditionally there would be no way
for the PD representative to know about such circumstances during the preliminary
arraignment. Only later in the process, after attorneys first had the opportunity to
interview clients, would such circumstances become apparent. The dearth of
information at the preliminary arraignment limits defense representatives’ ability to
raise meaningful arguments.
Under the pilot program, the Defender Association hired bail advocates who
are assigned to interview clients after arrest but before the preliminary arraignment.
During the interviews, advocates inform defendants about the criminal process, and
collect mitigating information that might be useful in the preliminary arraignment.
Examples of such information include information regarding unique burdens that

62. As of July 2016, the city instituted an automatic bail review process for nonviolent
offenders with bail amounts below $50,000 that occurs five days after the preliminary
arraignment. Anna Orso, Philly Criminal Justice Officials in ‘Damage Control’ Mode
Following Cash Bail Report, BILLY PENN (Oct. 27, 2017, 9:00 AM),
https://billypenn.com/2017/10/27/philly-criminal-justice-officials-in-damage-control-modefollowing-cash-bail-report/ [https://perma.cc/5N4G-K4BD]. This Early Bail review program
was expanded to individuals with bail of $100,000 or less in February 2019. FIRST JUD. DIST.
PA., PHILA. CT. COMMON PLEAS & PHILA. MUN. CT.. FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT TESTIMONY:
FISCAL YEAR 2020 OPERATING BUDGET 3 (2019), http://phlcouncil.com/wp-content/uploads
/2019/04/FY20-First-Judicial-District-Testimony-Submitted-4.22.19.pdf [https://perma.cc
/96CS-S8KH].
63. PHILA. BAIL FUND & PENNSYLVANIANS FOR MODERN COURTS, supra note 53, at 14.
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might arise due to unaffordable bail, family or other personal information that
establishes community ties, or low nonappearance risk. Advocates also serve as
information conduits to family members about the location and status of the
defendant, an important role given defendants’ limited access to outside
communication. Notably, advocates do not provide direct representation but instead
serve an information-gathering role, conveying information gleaned from their
interviews and follow-up to the PDs appearing in the courtroom. Advocates will, in
some cases, also follow up after a preliminary arraignment to collect necessary
documentation establishing employment or other prerequisites for release, and they
also assist clients who are released in accessing supportive services.
Conceptually, there are a range of possibilities for how a program such as the
advocates pilot might affect criminal justice outcomes. Bail advocates could
conceivably operate similar ARAIs, injecting more information into the initial
decision regarding release conditions. However, other mechanisms of action
different from those of ARAIs are also conceivable.
Perhaps the simplest possibility is that, like many promising interventions,
ultimately, the advocates do little to change pretrial decisions, either because the
advocates fail to collect useful information or because bail commissioners,
prosecutors, or other downstream actors neutralize the effect of the new information.
Under this “no effect” scenario, we would not expect to observe measurable changes
in release decisions or other outcomes following the introduction of the advocates.
A second scenario is one in which advocates enhance the ability of defense
attorneys in the courtroom to advocate for the narrow interests of their clients. Under
this “enhanced defense” scenario, information provided by advocates enables
defense attorneys to more successfully argue for less restrictive pretrial conditions
for all types of defendants, including those who may be likely to recidivate or fail to
appear for court.
A third possibility is that the bail advocates collect useful information about
clients that enables bail commissioners, prosecutors, and defenders to better identify
those at high risk of nonappearance or recidivism, and therefore make more tailored
release decisions. In this scenario, bail advocates are operating similarly to ARAIs.
For example, it seems likely that some defendants assigned unaffordable bail and
therefore detained under the status quo system would not have in fact recidivated or
failed to appear had they been released; if bail advocates facilitate the identification
of such individuals, they are essentially providing improved risk information to other
decisionmakers in the system. How this better information would manifest in
outcomes depends on how other parts of the system operate. One possibility is that
more defendants would be released without increasing nonappearance or future
crime. An alternative possibility is that the same number of people would be released
while nonappearance and future crime diminish.
A fourth possibility is that bail advocates do not affect the behavior of other
decisionmakers in the system but do affect defendant behavior. If, for example,
speaking to an advocate early on in the case lends additional legitimacy to the
adjudication process in the minds of defendants,64 and therefore fosters greater

64. Douglas L. Colbert, Ray Paternoster, and Shawn Bushway demonstrate using survey
data that this was indeed the case in their study of defendants in Baltimore. See supra note 12.
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compliance and cooperation, even absent any impact of release decisions, we might
observe changes in FTA rates or future crime.
A final possibility is a “backfire effect,” whereby advocates actually negatively
impact release rates. Such a situation could occur if efforts by public defenders to
raise arguments on behalf of their clients are disfavored by bail commissioners or
prosecutors,65 and this distaste affects release decisions. In this scenario, introducing
advocates would actually increase pretrial detention, and through an incapacitation
effect would likely reduce FTA and future crime.
Table 1 summarizes the scenarios outlined above.
Table 1: Potential Impacts of Bail Advocates
Predicted effects on:
Scenario
No impact
Enhanced defense
Better risk management I
Better risk management II
Defendant response
Backfire

Pretrial
Release
0
+
0
+
0
-

FTA
0
+
0
-

Future
Crime
0
+
0
-

C. Prior Research on Representation at Bail Hearings
Whether improving representation at first appearance affects outcomes such as
FTA, case outcomes, and posthearing crime is ultimately an empirical question, but
one for which there is only limited existing evidence. A handful of recent studies
examine this question using observational research designs that compare outcomes
for defendants with and without early counsel. Notable examples include Alissa
Worden et al.’s study of the introduction of counsel at first appearance in three
counties in New York66 and Alena Yarmosky’s study of a pilot “Pre-Trial Release
Unit” of the San Francisco Public Defender,67 which uses propensity score modeling
to account for differences between defendants with and without early counsel. Both
studies found evidence that early representation leads to elevated rates of pretrial
release, but neither study explicitly examined outcomes such as FTA nor rearrest that
may have resulted from elevated release rates.

65. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Judge Orders Detention of Public Defender for ‘Acting
Like I’m Some Kind of Idiot,’ ABA J. (Oct. 30, 2018, 4:11 PM), https://perma.cc/V8SE-YC7J.
66. Alissa Pollitz Worden, Kirstin A. Morgan, Reveka V. Shteynberg & Andrew L. B.
Davies, What Difference Does a Lawyer Make? Impacts of Early Counsel on Misdemeanor
Bail Decisions and Outcomes in Rural and Small Town Courts, 29 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV.
710 (2018).
67. ALENA YARMOSKY, CAL. POL’Y LAB, THE IMPACT OF EARLY REPRESENTATION: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE SAN FRANCISCO PUBLIC DEFENDER’S PRE-TRIAL RELEASE UNIT (2018).
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These more recent studies are motivated by an older experimental literature that
suggests that the provision of counsel at bail hearings can affect case outcomes. The
Manhattan Bail Project, the earliest and most influential of these experiments,
demonstrated that collecting individualized defendant information prior to bail
hearings substantially increased the likelihood of release on recognizance (60% vs.
14%) while actually reducing FTA rates (1% vs. 4%).68 Later, Fazio et al. reported
results from a three-site randomized control trial (RCT) involving over 5000 subjects
randomly assigned to receive representation as usual or early assignment to public
defender services, typically within a day or two of arrest.69 Pretrial release rates
increased in one of the three sites and release occurred more quickly on average in
all sites.70 Early representation also reduced conviction rates and shortened case
processing time.71 In the most recent RCT, Colbert, Paternoster, and Bushway
provided counsel to Baltimore defendants who would have gone otherwise
unrepresented in early bail review hearings.72 They found that representation
increased the pretrial release rate from 50% to 65% with no corresponding increase
in rearrest up through six months posthearing.73 The authors did not explicitly
consider FTA but did find that representation improved defendants’ perceptions
across a range of procedural justice items, including intention to abide by the bail
decision.74
The prior literature thus suggests that representation at first appearance can
causally influence release rates and other downstream outcomes. This paper expands
upon this existing work in several ways: (1) it focuses on enhancing the quality of
representation at first appearance rather than providing any representation at all, an
improvement to the pretrial process that will become increasingly policy relevant as
more jurisdictions provide counsel at first appearance; (2) like the prior experimental
work, it provides strong causal estimates of the effect of enhanced representation,
but within the context of a contemporary criminal justice system; and (3) it considers
a wider range of outcomes, most notably both FTA and pre- and post-adjudication
rearrest.
III. DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN
To understand whether bail advocates improve the pretrial process, we seek to
measure how bail advocates affect outcomes such as FTA, conviction, and future
criminal activity. The effect of having a bail advocate represents the difference in
outcomes that would occur when a defendant has access to the services of a bail

68. Charles E. Ares, Anne Rankin & Herbert Sturz, The Manhattan Bail Project: An
Interim Report on the Use of Pre-Trial Parole, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 67, 82, 86 (1963).
69. ERNEST FAZIO, JR., SANDRA WEXLER, THOMAS FOSTER, MICHAEL J. LOWY, DAVID
SHEPPARD & JULIET A. MUSSO, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 97595,
EARLY REPRESENTATION BY DEFENSE COUNSEL FIELD TEST: FINAL EVALUATION REPORT
(1984).
70. Id. at 361.
71. Id. at 362.
72. Colbert, Paternoster & Bushway, supra note 12, at 1728–31.
73. Id. at 1757.
74. Id. at 1762.
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advocate as compared to an otherwise identical situation when that individual does
not have a bail advocate. Because we can never observe both the true and
counterfactual outcome for the same person, estimating such effects requires us to
instead compare outcomes across pools of different defendants. Ideally, these pools
would be as similar as possible to each other except in their access to the bail
advocate to ensure that any outcome differences we observe represent the effects of
the advocates rather than other uncontrolled differences in the defendant pools.
Randomization is one way to achieve such comparability; when randomization is not
possible, researchers typically turn to other less-robust methods such as matching or
regression analysis.
In measuring the effects of the bail advocates, our primary data source is
administrative court dockets obtained from the public website of the Unified Judicial
System of Pennsylvania.75 These dockets cover the universe of unsealed criminal
cases in Philadelphia and reflect the official record of the proceedings in each case.
We limit the sample to cases with preliminary arraignments recorded in the
Philadelphia Municipal Court that occurred between April 1, 2016, and March 31,
2019, yielding a pool of 99,091 cases.76
Each docket records the identity and demographic information of the defendant
(gender, race, date of birth, residence ZIP code); information about the arrest; charges
filed in the case; procedural progress; bail amounts and status; court calendaring; and
eventual outcome. Using court summary reports published by the Unified Judicial
System, we also compiled information about the prior criminal history and future
criminal history of each defendant.77
The Defender Association of Philadelphia maintains records of all individuals
represented by bail advocates, which they furnished to us and which we linked to the
court dockets. Over the period in question, advocates worked with 2176 individual
defendants. Table 1 reports summary statistics describing the overall sample and,
separately, the individuals represented by advocates. Clients with advocates were
more likely to be female, less likely to have a violent charge, more likely to have a
drug charge, and less likely to have a prior felony conviction, among other
differences. The differences shown in Table 1 likely stem from two factors. First, the
defendants who are arraigned when bail advocates are working are different from the
overall defendant population because bail advocates only staff day shifts on
weekdays in one pretrial facility. Second, because advocates lack sufficient time to
handle all defendants who show up in a particular shift, they focus efforts on
defendants who might most plausibly benefit from a more individualized
consideration in the preliminary arraignment. For example, advocates might
deprioritize defendants with no prior record facing low-level charges, who will likely

75. Case Information, THE UNIFIED JUD. SYS. OF PA. WEB PORTAL,
https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/CaseInformation.aspx [https://perma.cc/B82U-J3F9].
76. Because anyone with a preliminary arraignment could in theory be served by a bail
advocate, the appropriate approach is to include all such individuals in the sample. As a
practical matter, however, there are some defendants, such as those currently on probation,
those with other pending matters, those with holds such as immigration holds that preclude
release, and those who will likely qualify for a diversion program who will be presumptively
released who would be unlikely to be selected for an interview by the bail advocates.
77. These records are limited to cases within the State of Pennsylvania.
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be released on recognizance in any case, or defendants accused of serious crimes or
those with extensive histories of nonappearance, who will likely receive high bails
regardless of the intervention of the advocate.
Table 1: Characteristics of Philadelphia Criminal Defendants
by Bail Advocate Status

Characteristic
Demographics
Male
Black
Other nonwhite race
Age (years)
ZIP code poverty rate
Current case
# felony charges
# misdemeanor charges
Violent offense
Drug offense
Represented
by appointed counsel
Represented
by public defender
Prior history
# prior arrests
# prior felony
convictions
# prior misdemeanor
convictions
# local bail violations

Entire
Sample

No Bail
Advocate
(N=96915)

Has Bail
Advocate
(N=2176)

% Difference:
Advocate vs.
No Advocate

P-value

81.9%
57.9%
2.6%
34.4
29.9%

82.3%
58.0%
2.6%
34.4
29.9%

66.0%
53.8%
2.9%
35.0
30.8%

-19.7%
-7.2%
12.0%
1.9%
3.1%

< .001
< .001
0.389
0.009
0.002

0.922
1.579
18.9%
26.1%
11.7%

0.922
1.580
19.0%
25.8%
11.6%

0.941
1.502
14.8%
37.9%
15.2%

2.0%
-5.0%
-21.8%
47.0%
30.3%

0.598
0.007
< .001
< .001
< .001

74.7%

74.8%

72.4%

-3.2%

0.015

1.76
2.52

1.77
2.53

1.50
2.29

-15.0%
-9.3%

< .001
0.007

0.26

0.26

0.27

0.9%

0.888

0.991

0.991

0.998

0.7%

< .001

Table 1 highlights the need to account for differences in the populations who were
and were not served by the bail advocates in measuring advocates’ impact. While
observable differences, such as those shown in the table, can be accounted for
through regression modeling or matching, as in Alena Yarmosky’s work,78 a
persistent concern is that these two populations might differ in unobservable ways.
Estimates of the effect of bail advocates would be biased in the presence of such
uncontrolled differences. For example, suppose certain defendants are combative and
noncooperative, and therefore unwilling to engage with bail advocates and less likely
to be represented by them. Suppose further that combativeness during the
preliminary arraignment leads a bail commissioner to assign higher bail amounts.

78. YARMOSKY, supra note 67.
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Under such a scenario, in a regression or matching analysis, we would see that the
presence of bail advocates is associated with lower bail amounts, but this pattern
would reflect the omitted variable of combativeness rather than the true causal effect
of the advocates.
To overcome this obstacle, we can exploit a useful feature of the pilot. For
logistical reasons, as the pilot started, it was necessary to confine the bail advocates
to daytime (7 a.m.–3 p.m.) arraignment shifts in a single location on weekdays. Even
under these restrictions, the Defender Association anticipated that they would only
be able to cover a subset of available preliminary arraignment shifts. To facilitate a
quasi-experimental evaluation, at our request, they intentionally shuffled the days of
the week on which bail advocates were available to assist new clients. To illustrate,
Figure 1 depicts a calendar covering June–August 2017, with the days during which
advocates were available to take cases highlighted in grey. The figure shows that the
particular weekdays covered by the bail advocates varied unsystematically from
week to week, with the advocates covering as few as zero and as many as four days
depending on the week, and also covering each of the days from Monday through
Friday. The patterns shown in the figure are representative of the implementation of
the pilot across the entire study period.
Figure 1: Bail Advocate Availability, June–August 2017
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To demonstrate the advantages of this quasi-random approach to implementation,
Table 2 compares the characteristics of those with preliminary arraignments on dates
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and shifts when bail advocates were not staffing cases to those with arraignments
where advocates were taking new clients. Because patterns of criminal activity are
known to vary seasonally and across days of the week, the differences in the table
are presented controlling for the day of week and week. The quasi-random shift
shuffling employed by the Defender Association created two pools of defendants—
those arraigned on “off” days and those arraigned on “on” days—that are statistically
indistinguishable but that nonetheless differ greatly in the likelihood of being
represented by a bail advocate. Given that the two pools of defendants appear highly
similar on observable characteristics, it seems plausible to think that they are
comparable on unobservables such as cooperativeness, quality of information about
the case, etc. as well, just as would be the case had bail advocates been randomly
assigned to clients. Comparing outcomes across these two pools of defendants is thus
likely to provide a good causal estimate of the effects of the bail advocates.
Table 2: Defendant Characteristics by Arraignment Timing

Characteristic
Had Bail Advocate
Demographics
Male
Black
Other nonwhite race
Age (years)
ZIP code poverty rate
Current case
# felony charges
# misdemeanor
charges
Violent offense
Drug offense
Represented
by appointed counsel
Represented
by public defender
Prior history
# prior arrests
# prior felony
convictions
# prior misdemeanor
convictions
# local bail violations

Arraignment Shift when
Bail Advocate:
Not Taking
Taking
Cases
Cases
(N=87995)
(N=11096)
0.1%
18.6%

% Difference:
Advocate vs.
No Advocate

P-value
< .001

81.7%
58.2%
2.6%
34.4
29.8%

81.7%
58.1%
2.5%
34.3
29.9%

0.0%
-0.1%
-3.3%
-0.2%
0.4%

0.946
0.907
0.683
0.662
0.502

0.927

0.912

-1.6%

0.584

1.593

1.540

-3.3%

0.010

19.3%
25.3%

18.9%
25.8%

-1.7%
2.2%

0.510
0.373

11.7%

11.9%

1.7%

0.643

74.6%

75.4%

1.0%

0.191

4.27

4.31

1.0%

0.605

1.77

1.82

3.2%

0.289

2.53

2.48

-2.0%

0.406

0.261

0.251

-4.0%

0.363

Appendix Table 1 reports results for a more formal statistical test for as-good-asrandom assignment that involves regressing the indicator for a bail advocate shift on
the observable characteristics of the defendant and case while also conditioning on
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day of week by hour and week fixed effects to take into account the manner in which
the pilot was implemented. If shift days were selected in a manner unrelated to
expected case outcomes, we should not see a strong relationship between defendant
or case characteristics and shift assignment. Appendix Table 1 demonstrates that is
in fact the case, and an omnibus F-test fails to reject the null hypothesis of no
relationship between observables and shift assignment (p = .462).
To implement the quasi-experiment, we turn to instrumental variable (IV)
regression. For our primary specifications, we estimate defendant-level IV
regressions where we model each defendant’s criminal justice outcome of interest
(e.g., an indicator for whether the defendant was detained pretrial) as a function of
an indicator for whether the defendant was represented by the bail advocate. We
instrument for bail advocate representation with an indicator for whether the
defendant had a preliminary arraignment on a shift when the bail advocates were
taking cases. We also include as controls variables capturing defendant
demographics (indicators for gender, age, race, and ZIP code of residence), prior
criminal history (arrests, felony convictions, misdemeanor convictions, and bail
revocations or forfeitures), current case characteristics (detailed top charge and total
number of felony and misdemeanor counts, attorney type [appointed counsel or
public defender], and bail commissioner fixed effects), and case timing (hour by day
of week and week of arraignment fixed effects).79
Conceptually, these regressions measure the average expected difference in the
outcome between a defendant with a bail advocate and defendant without an
advocate who is otherwise similar in terms of demographics, prior criminal history,
charge, case timing, etc. Thus, any differences we observe in outcomes cannot be
attributed to the fact that defendants with bail advocates may have more or less
extensive criminal histories than other defendants or tend to appear for arraignments
at particular times of the week. Even if advocates target particular types of
defendants, so that those they ultimately represent are a nonrandom subset of the
overall pool of defendants, the IV approach should deliver valid causal estimates.80
IV. RESULTS
A. Bail and Pretrial Release
One objective of the bail advocates pilot was to enable Philadelphia to reduce its
jail population by lowering bail amounts or otherwise securing pretrial release for
more criminal defendants. To examine whether pretrial release conditions were
affected by the bail advocates, we estimated a series of IV regressions with bail- and

79. Individuals who have immigration holds or detainers due to the fact that they are
already on probation for a prior offense may not be eligible for immediate pretrial release.
Unfortunately, detainers and holds are not well represented in the data, so the analysis does
not control for them. However, there is little reason to expect these case features to vary
systematically across shifts that were and were not covered by bail advocates.
80. The primary assumption required for the IV approach to deliver causal estimates is
that there is nothing about the particular shifts selected as advocate shifts that would lead
defendants arraigned on those shifts to be systematically different from defendants arraigned
at similar times of the week but in weeks where advocates were unavailable.
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release-related outcomes as dependent variables using the approach described above.
Appendix Table 2 reports coefficient estimates from the first-stage IV regressions
that model whether or not a particular defendant is represented by a bail advocate as
a function of a 0/1 indicator variable for whether they were arraigned during a shift
when bail advocates were available to take cases. The table reveals a strong firststage relationship between arraignment on a shift with bail advocates and eventual
representation by advocates, with F-statistics sufficiently high so as to preclude weak
instrument concerns. The table also shows that during this period of the pilot only
about one in five defendants that could have been represented by advocates were in
fact represented by them, suggesting that during this initial phase of the pilot
advocates maintained a fair bit of discretion as to whom to interview.
Results of the analysis of bail outcomes are presented in Table 3. The top row of
the table reports estimates of the effect of bail advocates on the overall detention rate,
which we define as the share of defendants who both are never granted nonmonetary
release conditions and who never post monetary bail prior to case disposition. There
is no statistically significant relationship between availability of the bail advocate
and the detention rate, meaning that advocates do not measurably increase the rate
of pretrial release.
Table 3: Estimated Effect of Bail Advocates on Pretrial Release and Bail
Conditions

Outcome
Detained pretrial
Initial bail amount ($)
Released on recognizance
Offered unsecured bail
Monetary bail required
Bail was modified down during case

Mean
for Those
Without
Advocate
0.286
$28,618
0.372
0.078
0.513
0.075

Estimated
Impact of
Advocate
-0.014
(0.032)
-1034
(5,745)
-0.059+
(0.034)
0.013
(0.027)
0.023
(0.032)
-0.017
(0.023)

Implied %
Change
-5.0%
-3.6%
-15.9%
16.1%
4.5%
-23.1%

Note: This table reports results from IV regressions of the listed outcome on an indicator for
whether the defendant has access to bail advocates and additional controls. We instrument for
the bail advocate indicator using an indicator for an arraignment during a shift where bail
advocates were taking cases. The unit of observation is a defendant within a case and the
sample size is 98,916 for all outcomes except bail amount. For bail amount, the top 0.5% of
values (>$1 million) have been trimmed, leaving a sample size of 98,419. Each table entry
reports results from a separate regression. Controls include hour by day of week and week of
arraignment fixed effects, variables capturing defendant demographics (indicators for gender,
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age, race, and ZIP code of residence), prior criminal history (indicators for numbers of arrests,
felony convictions, misdemeanor convictions, and bail revocations or forfeitures), and current
case characteristics (fixed effects for detailed top charge, total number of felony and
misdemeanor counts, attorney type, and bail commissioner). Standard errors clustered on
arraignment date are reported in parentheses, and the implied percent change in the outcome
(effect estimate divided by mean for those with no advocate) is also reported. + denotes an
estimate that is statistically significant at the 10% level, * at the 5% level, ** at the 1% level.

The next four rows of the table examine various bail-related outcomes to see if,
on average, advocates change the types of bail conditions imposed. Bail advocates
do not measurably increase the use of ROR or affect rates at which magistrates
impose monetary bail. There is no measurable change in average bail amounts.81 We
do see a practically large, albeit not statistically significant, reduction in downward
bail modifications82 when an advocate is present. This result does not admit a clear
interpretation; one possibility is that advocates enable bail magistrates to assign more
appropriate bail conditions from the outset, rendering it less necessary to return and
revise conditions further along in the case. Overall, we do not see strong evidence
that bail advocates altered bail outcomes, at least on average, although most of these
estimates are sufficiently imprecise that they cannot preclude moderate positive or
negative impacts of bail advocates on the outcome in question.
B. Failure to Appear and Future Crime
The primary purposes of pretrial supervision are to ensure defendants appear in
court and to minimize criminal infractions during the pretrial period. Table 4 reports
estimates of the impact of bail advocates on proxies for failure to appear and future
dangerousness. Because the quality of data on actual appearance at each scheduled
hearing are limited, and, in any case, there can be excusable reasons for failing to
show up for court appointments (e.g., illness), our preferred proxies for pretrial
nonadherence are the two major categories of formal sanction for bail violations—
revocation of release and revocation with forfeiture. Revocations of release occur
when bail is initially set, but, at a subsequent hearing, the judicial authority
determines that the defendant should no longer be released on bail, usually because
of an additional intervening offense. Bail revocations with forfeiture occur when an
individual is assessed the required amount of bail due to failure to abide by the terms
of the bail, which typically means nonappearance in court. We also consider overall
bail violations, which comprise both revocations of release and revocations with
forfeiture, as an additional outcome. An advantage of focusing on these measures is
that they are part of the formal record of proceedings and are therefore collected
systematically for all defendants; moreover, they focus attention on activity that has
been evaluated and deemed of sufficient import by a judge so as to merit a legal
consequence rather than mere technical violations.

81. For the analysis of bail amounts we trimmed the top 0.5% of observations (bail
amounts > $1 million) to exclude outlier cases; estimates on the full sample are substantially
less precise and generate comparable conclusions.
82. A downward bail modification occurs when, at some point after the preliminary
arraignment, a defendant’s bail is reduced or eliminated.
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Pretrial conditions are also used to manage danger to public safety. As a proxy for
dangerousness, we focus on future arrests, defined as the total count of new arrests
accrued by the defendant subsequent to the arraignment.83 While it may seem more
natural to consider pretrial arrest as the outcome of interest, a drawback of that metric
is that the amount of time required to resolve a case might itself depend on whether
an advocate is available.84 If advocates affect time to case resolution in some cases,
then measured changes in pretrial crime confound actual changes in criminal activity
with differences in exposure time across defendants. Measuring future crime
unconditional on how the case is processed more closely reflects actual criminal
activity, and thus is a preferred approach. For completeness, however, we also report
impacts on pretrial arrest, which we define as arrest occurring between the
preliminary arraignment and recorded case disposition date.
Table 4: Estimated Effect of Bail Advocates on Bail Outcomes and Future Crime

Outcome
Any bail violation
Revocation of release
Revocation with forfeiture
Any future arrest
# future arrests
# pretrial arrests
Note: See notes for Table 3.

Mean for Those
Without
Advocate
0.070
0.025
0.045
0.580
0.994
0.188

Estimated
Impact of
Advocate
-0.045*
(0.020)
-0.025*
(0.010)
-0.022
(0.017)
-0.116⁺
(0.062)
-0.254*
(0.123)
-0.078⁺

Implied %
Change
-64.3%
-96.5%
-48.9%
-20.0%
-25.6%
-41.4%

(0.044)

Table 5 demonstrates that bail advocates have a statistically significant and
practically large impact on the likelihood of a bail violation, reducing it by 64%.
Both revocations of release and revocations with forfeiture experience large
decreases from bail advocates, although impacts are statistically significant for only
the former measure. Other factors being equal, bail advocates are estimated to reduce

83. Arrest data are drawn from the court summary reports for each case, which report the
entire criminal history for a particular defendant.
84. Implementing the IV estimation approach described above, we did not observe a
statistically significant relationship between having a bail advocate and the number of days
required to resolve a case, although the confidence interval on this estimate was wide, meaning
that the data do not permit us to draw precise conclusions about how bail advocates affect
overall case processing time.
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future arrests by 26%, a sizeable impact. Estimated impacts on the likelihood of
future arrest and arrest during the pretrial period are of comparable direction and
magnitude. By way of comparison, using a large administrative dataset and strong
empirical research design, Kleinberg et al. estimate that using a machine learningbased ARAI could enable bail magistrates in New York City to reduce crime by 25%
relative to unaided decision-making if they elected to maintain constant release
rates.85 Taken together, these results thus suggest that improving the quality of early
defense representation might generate reductions in crime comparable to those
achievable using high-quality ARAIs.
C. Case Outcomes
Does the lower incidence of FTA and pretrial arrest shown above translate into
improved case outcomes for defendants? Table 5 presents IV estimates that measure
the impact of bail advocates on conviction and sentencing. Only about 60% of
criminal cases in Philadelphia generate a conviction or a referral to diversion; in the
remaining approximately 40% of cases the defendant is acquitted or all charges are
dropped or dismissed. The top rows of Table 5 indicate that representation by the
bail advocates is associated with a statistically significant and practically significant
decrease in the likelihood of a guilt determination, which we define here as a
conviction, guilty plea, or diversion. The table also reveals a statistically significant
(p = .06) reduction in the likelihood of a probation sentence, representing a shift of
7.2% of the defendant population away from probation, and no measurable change
in the likelihood of a jail sentence. Taken as a whole, Table 5 suggests that bail
advocates produce more lenient sentences for some defendants.
One possible explanation for the reduction in findings of guilt is that bail
advocates may encourage greater engagement of defendants with their defense team,
allowing them to achieve better outcomes for clients. Another logical interpretation
of these results is that one effect of the advocates is to induce greater compliance
with bail conditions, as shown in Table 4, and judges respond to this improved
compliance by being less inclined to require additional defendant supervision
postadjudication. Such a pattern would be consistent with work by Issa KohlerHausman, who, focusing on misdemeanor courts, proposed a managerial rather than
adjudicative model of the courts to explain how they surveil and control criminal
defendants.86 Here, because defendants with bail advocates demonstrate better
“performance” during the pretrial period, they are subjected to less onerous control
further on in the process.

85. Jon Kleinberg, Himabindu Lakkaraju, Jure Leskovec, Jens Ludwig & Sendhil
Mullainathan, Human Decisions and Machine Predictions, 133 Q. J. ECON. 237 (2017).
86. See ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS AND SOCIAL
CONTROL IN AN AGE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING (2018); Issa Kohler-Hausmann,
Misdemeanor Justice: Control Without Conviction, 119 AM. J. SOC. 351 (2013).
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Table 5: Estimated Effect of Bail Advocates on Case Outcomes
Mean for
Those
Without
Advocate
0.581

Outcome
Any guilty

0.525

Any conviction

0.287

Any diversion

0.255

Fraction of charges guilty
Fraction of charges diverted
Probation sentence
Jail sentence

0.654
0.370
0.165

Estimated
Impact of
Advocate
-0.079*
(0.040)
-0.056
(0.039)
-0.056
(0.036)
-0.014
(0.024)
0.033
(0.027)
-0.073⁺
(0.039)
0.006
(0.029)

Implied
%
Change
-13.7%
-10.6%
-19.7%
-5.6%
5.0%
-19.6%
3.7%

Note: See notes for Table 3. Sample size is 79,979. “Any guilty” includes individuals who are
convicted or plead guilty to at least one charge or who participate in a diversion program.

D. Sensitivity Analysis
Are the results above sensitive to how the IV models are implemented? Appendix
Table 3 reports results from a series of alternative models that vary the sample or
statistical model specification. For comparative purposes, the first specification
shows the baseline estimates reported above across the key outcomes of detention,
bail failures, future arrest, conviction, and sentencing types. The first sensitivity
analysis re-estimates the model but without control covariates other than hour by day
and week fixed effects; if the statistical assumptions underlying the natural
experiment are satisfied, then inclusion of controls should not appreciably alter the
effect estimates.87 The next specification drops the preimplementation period from
the analysis and focuses attention on only the period during which the bail advocates
were operating. Specification 4 omits controls for whether the defendant was
represented by appointed counsel or the public defender later in the case; in theory,
the presence of a bail advocate might affect a defendant’s willingness to retain private
counsel, in which case attorney type would be an outcome of the bail advocate
process and therefore not properly included as a control covariate.

87. The baseline models do include controls because including controls helps to guard
against potential departures from randomization and also should tend to increase the precision
with which effects can be estimated.
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The next specification in the sensitivity analysis implements a matching estimator
by estimating the probability that a particular defendant will be represented by a bail
advocate as a function of her demographics and case characteristics and then
controlling finely for this probability in the IV analysis.88 This has the effect of
matching each defendant who had a bail advocate to another individual who, based
on their demographics, charge, criminal history, and other case characteristics, would
appear equally suitable for representation by an advocate, but who did not appear on
a shift when advocates were taking cases. Specification 6 expands the baseline
sample by including a set of cases which, by 2019, had been expunged from the court
records.89
The bail advocates we interviewed indicated that they were strategic in selecting
who they would represent, focusing attention on individuals who, based on their
charge and prior criminal history, would seem most likely to benefit from having
additional personalized information presented at the preliminary arraignment.90 Such
a selection process would render traditional methods used to analyze observational
data, such as those used by Worden and Yarmosky,91 problematic and subject to
potential bias. In the final rows of Appendix Table 3, we apply the traditional
regression approach to these data. In contrast to the experimental estimates, the
nonexperimental analysis yields little evidence that bail advocates affect bail failure
or sentences. These differences highlight the value of the quasi experiment.
We also tested the sensitivity of our approach for conducting statistical inference.
We gauged statistical significance above using p-values based on standard errors
clustered on arraignment date, a conservative approach that accounts for the fact that
advocate availability is assigned at the day rather than at the individual level. As an
additional check, we calculated p-values via randomization inference,92 a simulationbased approach that requires minimal statistical assumptions about the datagenerating process to generate p-values.93 As shown in Appendix Table 4, we

88. More specifically, I estimate a probit model to construct a predicted likelihood of
being represented by an advocate for each defendant and then include fixed effects for 41,546
strata of the predicted probabilities as controls in the IV regression model.
89. We are able to include expunged cases because we collected the data for the study at
two points in time—once in August 2018 and again in May 2019. In the August 2018 vintage
of the data, we are able to observe 2972 cases that had been expunged by May 2019. A
comparison of the two datasets suggests that roughly 7% of all cases are ultimately expunged,
and expungements appear concentrated among a few specific offense categories. An
unreported analysis conducted by the author provided no indication of a relationship between
having a bail advocate and later expungement.
90. Interview with Bail Advoc. #1, in Phila., Pa. (Feb. 26, 2019); Interview with Bail
Advoc. #2, in Phila., Pa. (Feb. 26, 2019).
91. Worden et al., supra note 66; YARMOSKY, supra note 67.
92. See Susan Athey & Guido W. Imbens, The Econometrics of Randomized Experiments,
in HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC FIELD EXPERIMENTS 73, 94–99 (Abhijit Vinayak Banerjee &
Esther Duflo eds., 2017).
93. For each iteration of the simulation, we first randomly shuffled, without replacement,
the weekdays occurring between April 1, 2017, and January 31, 2019 (when the pilot was
operational), so that each simulated weekday was assigned to be an “on” or “off” day, and
each “on” day had an associated fraction of defendants to be seen by advocates. We then
randomly selected from among the defendants appearing during the day shift to create the
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continue to observe statistically significant (P < .10) effects for key outcomes such
as bail failures and pretrial arrest when calculating p-values via randomization
inference.
E. Racial Disparities
We also estimated versions of our primary specification where we allowed the
effects of the bail advocates to differ by the race (Black vs. non-Black), gender (male
vs. female), or prior criminal history (no prior convictions vs. prior convictions) of
the defendant (Appendix Table 5). For the analysis by race, ideally we would have
separate measures of ethnicity and more detailed race information, but available data
contained significant limitations, reporting race but not ethnicity and including only
five racial categories, three of which together constituted only 1.2% of the sample.
We were thus forced to collapse into two broad categories, Black and non-Black.94
Using the racial data that were available, we did not observe group differences in
the effects of bail advocates on bail failures. However, for pretrial detention, while
we did not observe statistically significant differences in the impact of the advocates
by gender or prior criminal history, advocates were more effective when representing
Black defendants as compared to non-Black defendants.
From the results in Appendix Table 5, we can calculate how bail advocates affect
racial disparities in detention. Over the time period in question, 59% of arrestees
were Black, and without bail advocates, 32% of Black arrestees are ultimately
detained, versus 24% of non-Black arrestees. Thus, from a hypothetical pool of 100
arrestees, we would expect fifty-nine to be Black and forty-one non-Black, with
nineteen Black arrestees ultimately detained versus ten non-Black arrestees. Thus,
although only 59% of these hypothetical arrestees are Black, among the detained
population of twenty-nine persons, 66% are Black.
Our estimates indicate that bail advocates are more effective at reducing detention
for Black versus non-Black defendants. If all defendants had bail advocates, the
quasi-experimental estimates suggest that, from that same pool of 100 arrestees,
sixteen Black defendants would be detained and eleven non-Black defendants would
be detained. With advocates present, 58% of detainees are Black, a number in line
with this group’s proportion among arrestees. The estimates thus suggest that,
whereas racial disparities increase between arrest and detention under the status quo,
they no longer increase in an environment where bail advocates are available. The
experiment thus suggests that bail advocates can reduce racial disparities, an
important benefit which has not yet been rigorously demonstrated for other pretrial
reforms.

appropriate number of advocate “clients.” Finally, we then estimated the effects of bail
advocate presentation using the same IV models as in Tables 3–5, but with the simulated
treatment status. This approach ensures that key features of how the pilot was implemented—
the number of advocate days and the share of defendants seen by advocates—are preserved in
the simulation.
94. If Hispanic defendants or other people of color are treated similarly to Black
defendants, then our lack of ethnicity data would likely bias these estimates towards
understating the benefits of bail advocates in terms of reducing racial disparity. We thus view
the estimates below as conservative ones.
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V. WHY DO BAIL ADVOCATES HAVE THESE EFFECTS?
The preceding analysis demonstrates that bail advocates lower clients’ incidence
of future law enforcement contacts and rate of bail violations, increase the leniency
of sentences, and reduce racial disparities, but do not increase pretrial release rates.
Through what mechanisms might the program generate such effects?
The empirical findings above allow us to adjudicate between some of the
theoretical possibilities summarized in Table 1. Taken together, the results from
Table 3 and Table 4 indicate that bail advocates do not alter the aggregate release
rate but do appreciably decrease the likelihood of adverse outcomes such as
nonappearance or future crime. These patterns are not consistent with the models
where bail advocates have no impact, simply advance client interests to the detriment
of the public (“enhanced defense”), or backfire. They are also inconsistent with one
version of the “better risk management” model described above, in which system
actors use the informational advantage produced by the advocates to increase pretrial
release without adversely impacting FTA or public safety. They are potentially
consistent with improved risk management, in which system actors choose to use the
better information to optimize outcomes rather than liberalize release, as well as the
“defendant response” model, in which defendants change behavior in response to the
services provided by advocates.
To obtain greater insights regarding whether such mechanisms might plausibly
explain our results, we conducted semistructured interviews with a number of
individuals closely associated with the bail advocates program. Included among the
interviewees were two bail advocates, five line defenders from the Defender
Association, four senior Defender Association managers, a representative from the
District Attorney’s Office who handles preliminary arraignments, and a district
attorney with supervisory authority over the pretrial process.95 We also considered a
number of ancillary analyses to develop stronger evidence regarding the
mechanisms. The interviews and supplementary analyses suggest two primary
channels through which the bail advocates generated effects: enabling the court to
make more informed decisions regarding how to manage defendant risk of
nonappearance or future crime (“better risk management”) and changing how
defendants engaged with the lawyers and the adjudication process (“defendant
response”).

95. These interviews were conducted between January and May 2019. We attempted to
interview the bail magistrates in conjunction with the study, but they declined to participate,
citing ongoing litigation against the city regarding its bail processes. See Philadelphia
Community Bail Fund, et al. Pets. v. Commonwealth Arraignment Ct. Selected Postings, THE
UNIFIED JUD. SYS. OF PA., http://www.pacourts.us/news-and-statistics/cases-of-publicinterest/philadelphia-community-bail-fund-et-al-pets-v-commonwealth-arraignment-ct [https
://perma.cc/CL5J-CHCR]. We also explored interviewing public defender clients, whose
perspective on these issues would have been invaluable, but ethical and logistical constraints
ultimately precluded us from incorporating client interviews into the study design.
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A. Better Risk Management
One of the key functions of the bail advocates was to interview defendants to
collect mitigating information that could be presented during the bail hearing.
Numerous public defenders described how this additional information allowed them
to more effectively advocate for their clients. The public defenders expressed how
constraining it was for them to approach preliminary arraignments with limited,
sometimes incorrect information about clients constructed from what they perceived
as a biased perspective designed to convict.96 They noted a disconnect between the
sort of information useful for actually making arguments in the hearing—information
such as how much money the client can get access to if required to post bail97 or how
detention might disrupt a client’s childcare arrangements—and the more basic
information routinely collected by pretrial services (e.g., how much the client
typically earns or how many kids they have). Moreover, the standard approach of
representing defendants in preliminary arraignments without having previously
spoken with them raised informational barriers—normally, clients were counseled to
minimize speaking at arraignments to avoid making incriminating statements on the
record,98 and when they did speak, they would say things like “I can’t afford that
amount,” which, without further context, did little to advance the defense team’s
arguments.99
The bail advocates furnished a much richer base of knowledge about clients,
which the public defenders used to humanize the defendants for magistrates and
prosecutors.100 Many of the pieces of contextual information bail advocates provided
could speak to defendants’ risk of nonappearance or threat to public safety—for
example, information about community involvement,101 family arrangements,
potential interactions with victims if released,102 or mitigating circumstances
concerning prior offenses.103 In cases where the court record typically offered only
one side of the story suggesting high risk, such as in domestic violence cases where
only the complainant’s version of events was in the arresting officer’s record, the bail
advocate interviews often furnished more balanced information.104 Bail advocates
also encouraged family members to attend bail hearings, which sometimes helped to
mitigate magistrate concerns that clients might lack outside support for successfully
completing the adjudication process.105 In some cases, the bail advocates’

96. Interview with Pub. Def. Representative #1 in Phila., Pa. (Feb. 28, 2019); Interview
with Pub. Def. Representative #4 in Phila., Pa. (Apr. 25, 2019).
97. Interview with Pub. Def. Representative #2 in Phila., Pa. (Mar. 18, 2019); Interview
with Pub. Def. Representative #3 in Phila., Pa. (Apr. 3, 2019).
98. Interview with Pub. Def. Representative #1, supra note 96.
99. Id.
100. Interview with Pub. Def. Representative #3, supra note 97; Interview with Pub. Def.
Representative #4, supra note 96.
101. Interview with Pub. Def. Representative #2, supra note 97.
102. Interview with Dist. Att’y Representative #1 in Phila., Pa. (Apr. 24, 2019).
103. Id.
104. Interview with Pub. Def. Representative #4, supra note 96; Interview with Pub. Def.
Representative #6 in Phila., Pa. (May 9, 2019).
105. Interview with Pub. Def. Representative #3, supra note 97; Interview with Bail
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information would provide the defense team with a clearer understanding of how
others in the court work group might assess risk. For example, one interviewee noted
that the district attorney often had information about out-of-state cases unavailable
in the printed record;106 the bail advocate could collect such information from the
client and thus enable the defense team to better understand why the district attorney
might oppose bail in a particular case. For public defenders, the informational
advantages provided by bail advocates were apparent—as one interviewee
summarized, they felt excited when they saw that bail advocate information was
included in a client’s packet, and, conversely, they experienced cases without an
interview for which having a bail advocate probably would have made a
difference.107
The views of the public defenders were echoed in comments from representatives
from the District Attorney’s Office. A senior district attorney with managerial
responsibilities stated that, from a prosecutor’s perspective, more information about
the defendant is better, and the bail advocate program was an asset to the district
attorneys because they provide more information.108 A district attorney
representative who staffs bail hearings agreed, opining that the bail advocates made
their job easier.109 This interviewee also discussed how the bail recommendations
they proffered to the magistrate were affected by bail advocates, noting that there
were some serious cases where defendants would always be held and some cases
where it was easy to see alternatives to cash bail. However, according to this
prosecutor, there was a middle set of cases where things weren’t so clear, and in those
cases the bail advocate’s information could change the prosecutor’s mind about cash
bail versus an alternative.110
Interviewees also cited evidence that the magistrates were influenced by the work
of the bail advocates. One senior defender noted that magistrates were initially
skeptical of the bail advocates pilot, reasoning that the court’s Pretrial Services
Division already existed to collect defendant information. However, over time, a
number of magistrates saw the value of the program, and this interviewee noted
instances where magistrates would call for bail advocates during hearings to get
additional information.111 A different interviewee described how magistrates
sometimes specifically credited bail advocates for changing their minds about
release.112 Another defender cited an instance in which a magistrate modified a
$50,000 bail to a release on recognizance based on information developed by a bail
advocate.113 Similarly, a bail advocate also described being directly consulted by
magistrates in some cases and noted observing cases where the magistrate would

Advoc. #2, supra note 90.
106. Interview with Pub. Def. Representative #2, supra note 97.
107. Id.
108. Interview with Dist. Att’y Senior Manager #1 in Phila., Pa. (May 8, 2019).
109. Interview with Dist. Att’y Representative #1, supra note 102.
110. Id.
111. Interview with Pub. Def. Senior Manager #1, in Phila., Pa. (Feb. 7, 2019).
112. Interview with Pub. Def. Senior Manager #3, in Phila., Pa. (Mar. 28, 2019).
113. Interview with Pub. Def. Representative #2, supra note 97.
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initially set one bail and then modify it after hearing information about the client
obtained by the bail advocate.114
One district attorney cited specific cases that illustrate how bail advocates can
improve the ability of the court work group to assess the risk of nonappearance or
future crime. This interviewee described a case involving a defendant charged with
multiple counts of aggravated assault resulting from a minor altercation with police
officers; the defendant had no recent history of violent crime but a cluster of violent
offenses in the distant past. At the bail hearing, the defendant was not
communicative, and the bail guidelines called for many thousands of dollars in cash
bail. However, the bail advocate surfaced information that the prior violent offenses
had resulted from a previously untreated mental health issue stemming from the
defendant’s prior combat service that had been subsequently addressed. This new
information convinced the prosecutor and magistrate to support the defendant’s
release on an unsecured bond, and the defendant was ultimately diverted to a
specialized veterans court.115
In another illustrative case, a defendant was charged with criminal threats and as
a felon in possession of a firearm, serious charges that would normally carry a bail
of at least $150,000. The police failed to recover a firearm and the defendant was
visibly disabled when they appeared for their video hearing, two facts that rendered
the charges less credible but ones the interviewee assessed would likely nonetheless
have been insufficient to justify a departure from the usual high bail. However,
drawing upon information collected by a bail advocate, the public defender argued
at the hearing that the complaining witness was actually a drug-addicted individual
who knew the defendant well, had a key to the defendant’s home, and was trying to
get the defendant out of the way to gain access to pain medication recently prescribed
for the disability. With those additional contextual pieces in place, the prosecutor and
magistrate became convinced that this was a weak case, and the defendant was
granted an unsecured bond. Such an outcome was virtually unheard of for such
charges in the interviewee’s experience, but one the interviewee maintained was
justified by the facts.116 Both examples illustrate situations where the court work
group could easily have made poor risk assessments based on insufficient data. With
the more extensive information provided by the advocate, they were able to more
accurately understand the defendants’ risk levels.
These anecdotal accounts are bolstered by empirical evidence also consistent with
the better risk management scenario. If bail advocates enable the public defender
representative to raise novel arguments, we might expect this should prolong the
length of the bail hearing. Table 6 reports coefficient estimates from an IV regression
structured as before but using the length of the bail hearing in minutes as the
outcome.117 Based on the time stamps included in the court dockets, the typical bail

114. Interview with Bail Advoc. #2, supra note 90.
115. Interview with Dist. Att’y Representative #1, supra note 102.
116. Id.
117. Each record includes a time stamp down to the closest minute for when the bail
hearing began; we infer hearing length based upon the time stamps of successive cases. This
is an imperfect measure for a number of reasons: it rounds to the nearest minute, it does not
take into account transition time between cases, and it is common for members of the court
work group to spend time reviewing case files before they are officially on the clock. Interview
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hearing lasts approximately 2.9 minutes, but the presence of a bail advocate increases
the length of the hearing to 3.5 minutes. While modest in absolute terms, this is an
increase of over 20% in the time spent on the case. Clearly the bail advocates do
something to change how discussions proceed during the preliminary arraignment;
the most plausible interpretation is that they surface additional information that
increases the deliberative effort of the magistrates, DA, and PD representative.
Table 6: Effects of Bail Advocates on Length of Bail Hearing

Outcome
Length of Bail Hearing
(Minutes)

Mean for Those
Without
Advocate
2.882

Estimated
Impact of
Advocate
0.627+
(0.352)

Implied
%
Change
21.7%

Note: See notes for Table 3. Sample size is 92,092.

Examining whether the measured effects of bail advocates differ across individual
magistrates can furnish another source of indirect evidence as to whether bail
advocates alter magistrate decision-making. If the primary effect of advocates is to
alter defendant behavior, we wouldn’t necessarily expect to see heterogenous results
across magistrates; if, on the other hand, some magistrates are more receptive to the
information provided by advocates than others, we might observe such differences.
Multiple interviewees perceived a difference across magistrates in their
receptiveness to bail advocates,118 with several naming particular magistrates who
they viewed as more inclined to consult information from advocates.119
Table 7 presents results from regressions similar to those in Table 3, where the
outcomes are bail decisions, and we have interacted indicators identifying each of
the six main magistrates handling preliminary arraignments with the bail advocate
indicator. This approach allows us to assess statistically whether the effects of bail
advocates vary from one magistrate to the next. Table 7 reveals that for one of the
bail outcomes considered (ROR), there is a statistically significant and practically
important difference across magistrates in the effects of having a bail advocate. These
results seem consistent with interviewees’ claims that magistrates do indeed take into
account information provided by bail advocates, with some showing greater
receptivity than others.

with Dist. Att’y Representative #1, supra note 102. However, we see no reason to expect that
this measurement error should be correlated with assignment to a shift with a bail advocate.
118. Interview with Bail Advoc. #2, supra note 90; Interview with Dist. Att’y
Representative #1, supra note 102; Interview with Pub. Def. Representative #3, supra note 97.
119. Interview with Bail Advoc. #1, supra note 90; Interview with Bail Advoc. #2, supra
note 90; Interview with Dist. Att’y Representative #1, supra note 102.
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Table 7: Variation Across Magistrates in the Effects of Bail Advocates
Effect of Bail Advocates for Magistrate:
Outcome
Release on
Recognizance
(ROR)
Unsecured
Bail
Monetary
Bail
Initial Bail
Amount

A

B

C

D

E

F

-.238**

-.112+

.089

.075

-.066

-.131

(.061)

(.065)

(.062)

(.082)

(.080)

(.100)

.025

-.022

-.051

-.022

0.55

.233*

(.059)

(.040)

(.033)

(.048)

(.076)

(.115)

.010

-.011

.124*

-.005

-.070

.035

(.052)

(.071)

(.060)

(.080)

(.079)

(.054)

-2965

379

3581

-11,367

-5491

-15,291

(12,016)

(14,363)

(8,479)

(10,709)

(12,939)

(11,311)

Equality
across
Magistrates
P value
.001
.194
.426
.755

Note: This table reports results from IV specifications similar to those reported in Table 3 but
with additional interaction terms as explanatory variables to allow the effects of bail advocates
to vary across each of the six magistrates. The sample has been limited to the 86,747 cases
handled by the main six magistrates involved in bail hearings during the sample period. See
notes for Table 3. Each row reports coefficients from a specific IV regression. The final
column reports the p-value from a joint test of the null hypothesis that there are equal effects
of bail advocates across all magistrates.

Finally, there is abundant theoretical and empirical literature suggesting that
judges respond differently to minority defendants, which may reflect implicit bias
and/or heuristic reasoning.120 If bail advocates furnish better information to
magistrates, it is plausible to expect that such additional information might enable
judges to more readily overcome the influence of implicit bias or heuristics, which
would have the consequence of reducing racial disparities in detention. This is
exactly what the disparities analysis above reveals.
If bail advocates do indeed influence magistrate decision-making, why were
there no measurable effects on overall detention rates? Nearly every interviewee

120. David S. Abrams, Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Do Judges Vary in
Their Treatment of Race?, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 347 (2012); David Arnold, Will Dobbie &
Crystal S. Yang, Racial Bias in Bail Decisions, 133 Q.J. ECON. 1885, 1992 (2018); Matthew
Clair & Alix S. Winter, How Judges Think About Racial Disparities: Situational DecisionMaking in the Criminal Justice System, 54 CRIMINOLOGY 332 (2016); Stephen Demuth, Racial
and Ethnic Differences in Pretrial Release Decisions and Outcomes: A Comparison of
Hispanic, Black, and White Felony Arrestees, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 873 (2003); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Does Unconscious
Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009); Cassia Spohn, Racial
Disparities in Prosecution, Sentencing, and Punishment, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
ETHNICITY, CRIME, AND IMMIGRATION 166, 181–82 (Sandra M. Bucerius & Michael Tonry
eds., 2014).
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believed that the bail advocates would encourage more lenient outcomes, so the lack
of measured impact is perhaps surprising. One possibility is that the advocates did
produce a net increase in bail leniency, but their impact was below the range
statistically measurable given the size and nature of the pilot. The 95% confidence
interval on detention reported in Table 3 above, for example, encompasses increases
or decreases in detention of about 20%, meaning that even if detention decreased by
10 or 15%, there would not be a detectable statistically significant change.
Researchers have identified a psychological phenomenon known as sequential
contrast effects that might also explain the pattern of results. These effects arise in
settings involving sequential decisions and occur when evaluators assess the current
case in a sequence in reference to one or more prior cases; if the preceding case was
positive, the reference case appears correspondingly less positive by virtue of the
contrast, but if the preceding case was unfavorable, the current case appears
correspondingly more favorable. Contrast effects tend to generate a negative
autocorrelation in decisions over time and have been demonstrated in diverse
decision-making contexts including financial markets,121 sports,122 and speed
dating.123 One of the earliest empirical demonstrations of contrast effects was in the
context of criminal adjudication decisions,124 and this phenomenon has been
demonstrated specifically for adjudication decisions by criminal judges in
Pennsylvania.125
In the present context, after being presented with individualized information
collected through a bail advocate that successfully argues for a more lenient
treatment for one defendant, contrast effects, if operating, might predispose
magistrates to harsher treatment of later defendants in the sequence. On net, these
offsetting behaviors would generate no reduction in bail requirements on average in
shifts with advocates, as shown above, even though magistrates are in fact influenced
by the information provided by the advocates.

121. Daniel L. Chen, Tobias J. Moskowitz & Kelly Shue, Decision Making Under the
Gambler’s Fallacy: Evidence from Asylum Judges, Loan Officers, and Baseball Umpires, 131
Q.J. ECON. 1181, 1209–14 (2016) (showing negative autocorrelation in sequential decisions
by asylum judges, baseball umpires, and loan officers); Samuel M. Hartzmark & Kelly Shue,
A Tough Act to Follow: Contrast Effects in Financial Markets, 73 J. FIN. 1567, 1569–71 (2018)
(showing sequential contrast bias in evaluation of earnings announcements).
122. Chen et al., supra note 121, at 1215–26; Henning Plessner & Tilmann Betsch,
Sequential Effects in Important Referee Decisions: The Case of Penalties in Soccer, 23 J.
SPORT & EXERCISE PSYCH. 254, 256–58 (2001).
123. Saurabh Bhargava & Ray Fisman, Contrast Effects in Sequential Decisions: Evidence
from Speed Dating, 96 REV. ECON. & STAT. 444, 444–45 (2014) (showing that speed daters
are less likely to match with opposites who were preceded by attractive individuals in the
sequence).
124. Albert Pepitone & Mark DiNubile, Contrast Effects in Judgments of Crime Severity
and the Punishment of Criminal Violators, 33 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 448 (1976) (lab
experiment demonstrating that crimes were judged less harshly when preceded by a
particularly egregious crime).
125. Saurabh Bhargava, Essays in Psychology and Economics 47–58 (2008) (Ph.D.
dissertation, University of California Berkeley).
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B. Changes in Defendant Behavior
Beyond changing how criminal justice actors assess defendants, the interviews
also demonstrated that the bail advocates did substantial work to try to shape how
clients understood and engaged with the criminal adjudication process. Both bail
advocate interviewees viewed the information collection function they performed as
a secondary (albeit important) role; they described their primary role as one of
improving the client experience.126
Interviewees cited several features of the pretrial process that could serve to
alienate defendants and diminish their sense of the system’s legitimacy. Defendants
are thrust in the PDU following what for most are highly stressful encounters with
law enforcement but provided no meaningful tools for de-escalation.127 A number of
interviewees noted that, although the PDU ostensibly has phones available for
defendant use, as a practical matter the phones were often unavailable, leaving
defendants isolated from support networks.128 Many defendants are frightened and
do not understand the bail process or what will happen to them next.129 According to
interviewees, many clients want to be heard and feel as though they have some power
in the system,130 but without bail advocates, there is no one in the PDU who will
listen to them.
These adverse experiences can extend to the hearing itself. The physical
configuration of the hearings—with defendants assembled in one location and the
rest of the court group in a different location, appearing via video link—reinforces a
sense of separation and “otherness” to defendants. The video and audio quality are
often poor,131 there is no opportunity for private conversations between public
defenders and the clients with whom they have never previously spoken,132 and
defendants are often counseled by those ostensibly on their side not to speak.133 All
these factors can send a message to defendants that their participation is not valued.
Public defender clients also experience frustration from observing the contrast
between their experiences and those of defendants who have hired private attorneys,
who often have much more information about their clients and client perspectives at
the preliminary arraignment.134 Indeed, one senior public defender indicated that one

126. Interview with Bail Advoc. #1, supra note 90; Interview with Bail Advoc. #2, supra
note 90.
127. Interview with Bail Advoc. #1, supra note 90; Interview with Bail Advoc. #2, supra
note 90.
128. Interview with Bail Advoc. #2, supra note 90; Interview with Dist. Att’y Senior
Manager #1, supra note 102.
129. Interview with Bail Advoc. #1, supra note 90; Interview with Bail Advoc. #2, supra
note 90.
130. Interview with Bail Advoc. #2, supra note 87; Interview with Pub. Def.
Representative #1, supra note 96; Interview with Pub. Def. Representative #4, supra note 96.
131. Bryce Covert, Video Hearings: The Choice ‘Between Efficiency and Rights,’ THE
APPEAL (June 5, 2019), https://Theappeal.Org/Video-Hearings-The-Choice-BetweenEfficiency-And-Rights/ [https://perma.cc/UG9G-YW6V].
132. Id.
133. Interview with Pub. Def. Representative #1, supra note 96.
134. Interview with Pub. Def. Representative #6, supra note 104.
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of the benefits of the bail advocates program is that it has helped public defenders
better appreciate how clients typically understand little about the bail process and
how problematic the defendant experience is between booking and the preliminary
arraignment.135
A significant body of existing work on procedural justice pioneered by Tom Tyler
and others describes how citizens’ compliance with the law hinges on their
perceptions of the fairness, transparency, and legitimacy of legal authorities.136
Applied to the present context, that body of literature suggests the status quo
approach of offering charged persons limited voice and autonomy in the initial
encounter with the courts might erode later compliance. Other work highlights the
specific role of attorney-client communication in establishing clients’ sense of
procedural justice,137 so an innovation like the bail advocates that improves charged
persons’ ability to interact with their attorneys might plausibly improve these clients’
sense of being treated appropriately.
Bail advocates employ a variety of strategies to counteract the sense of
disengagement fostered by these conditions and encourage defendant participation
with the process. Advocates’ first objective when meeting with a client is deescalation—helping clients manage the emotional stress associated with arrest and
imprisonment in the PDU.138 Early on in the interview, advocates also seek to provide
defendants with an understanding of how the bail process works, assisting them to
visualize their place in the process and understand what is expected of them at the
bail hearing.139 They offer defendants a chance to share their version of what
happened with a sympathetic party, an opportunity generally not available until after
the preliminary arraignment under the traditional process.140 All of these strategies
can help clients to feel as though they are being treated more fairly, and there is some
evidence it has an immediate positive behavioral effect—a Defender Association
representative indicated that one PDU manager expressed belief that the presence of
the bail advocates calmed inmates and helped to reduce their disciplinary infractions
while in custody there.141

135. Interview with Pub. Def. Senior Manager #1, supra note 111.
136. E.g., E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE (1988); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990); Tom R. Tyler & E.
Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW 65 (Joseph
Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001); Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL.
L. REV. 181 (2004).
137. Christopher Campbell, Janet Moore, Wesley Maier & Mike Gaffney, Unnoticed,
Untapped, and Underappreciated: Clients’ Perceptions of Their Public Defenders, 33 BEHAV.
SCI. & L. 751, 762–64 (2015); Janet Moore, Vicki L. Plano Clark, Lori A. Foote & Jacinda K.
Dariotis, Attorney-Client Communication in Public Defense: A Qualitative Examination, 31
CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 908 (2020); Marla Sandys & Heather Pruss, Correlates of Satisfaction
Among Clients of a Public Defender Agency, 14 OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L. 431, 437–44 (2017).
138. Interview with Bail Advoc. #1, supra note 90; Interview with Bail Advoc. #2, supra
note 90.
139. Interview with Bail Advoc. #2, supra note 90.
140. Interview with Dist. Att’y Representative #1, supra note 102; Interview with Pub.
Def. Representative #1, supra note 96; Interview with Pub. Def. Representative #4, supra note
96.
141. Interview with Def. Ass’n Senior Manager #1, in Phila., Pa. (Feb. 7, 2019).
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Bail advocates help to connect clients with a larger support network. Given their
problematic phone access in the PDU, clients often rely on bail advocates to call
family members and notify them that the arrest had occurred.142 Advocates also relay
information to families about the timing and process for paying bail, encourage
family members to attend the preliminary arraignment if it appears that doing so
would be helpful, and in one case even assisted a family in negotiating with a bank
to release funds needed to pay bail.143 These measures served to better involve the
family and community in addressing the consequences of the arrest, rather than
leaving the defendant to rely primarily or solely on their own efforts.
Bail advocates also lay the groundwork for clients to engage in proactive activities
following release that would tend to discourage bail violations and promote
successful resolution of their case. Advocates’ activities in this vein include assessing
need with respect to issues such as drug treatment, mental health, housing, or benefits
and developing a release plan for the client to follow;144 ensuring clients have
someone to pick them up and a place to go when released;145 helping clients with
mental health or addiction needs gain access to treatment;146 or involving outside
case managers who had prior relationships with the client.147 After the preliminary
arraignments, bail advocates call clients and family members to encourage them to
come in to meet with their attorneys,148 access social services relevant to their case,149
and make future court appearances.150 Many of these measures are designed to shape
client behavior in directions with clear causal implications for the outcomes
considered above—for example, ensuring that a defendant exhibiting unaddressed
mental illness is released into treatment rather than back to the streets almost
certainly diminishes their likelihood of future rearrest for behaviors associated with
the illness, and reminding clients of court dates seems likely to reduce rates of bail
violations from nonappearance.151 And if bail advocates’ efforts such as those above
are successful, we would expect defendants to behave differently with respect to the
court, their attorneys, and their community; these positive effects would occur postarrest and pre-adjudication, and perhaps even continue after the case is resolved.

142. Interview with Bail Advoc. #1, supra note 90; Interview with Bail Advoc. #2, supra
note 90; Interview with Def. Ass’n Senior Manager #1, supra note 141; Interview with Pub.
Def. Representative #3, supra note 97.
143. Interview with Bail Advoc. #1, supra note 90; Interview with Bail Advoc. #2, supra
note 90.
144. Interview with Bail Advoc. #1, supra note 90; Interview with Bail Advoc. #2, supra
note 90; Interview with Def. Ass’n Senior Manager #4, in Phila., Pa. (May 8, 2019); Interview
with Pub. Def. Representative #3, supra note 97.
145. Interview with Pub. Def. Representative #1, supra note 96.
146. Interview with Def. Ass’n Senior Manager #3, in Phila., Pa. (Mar. 28, 2019);
Interview with Dist. Att’y Senior Manager #1, supra note 102; Interview with Pub. Def.
Representative #1, supra note 96; Interview with Pub. Def. Representative #2, supra note 97;
Interview with Pub. Def. Representative #3, supra note 97.
147. Interview with Bail Advoc. #1, supra note 90.
148. Id.; Interview with Bail Advoc. #2, supra note 90.
149. Interview with Pub. Def. Representative #3, supra note 97.
150. Interview with Bail Advoc. #2, supra note 90.
151. See COOKE ET AL., supra note 48.
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Although we lack direct measures of defendant behavior, several features of the
empirical results below tend to corroborate the interviewees’ beliefs that the bail
advocates modified at least some defendants’ behavior. First, the magnitude of the
impacts on bail failures is large enough that it seems implausible that such impacts
could be achieved solely through sorting. For example, absent some sort of
behavioral change by clients, for the advocates to reduce bail failures by over 90%
only through sorting, it would have to be the case that almost every individual sorted
into release as a result of the work of the bail advocates has no propensity to violate
bail conditions. Achieving such finely targeted results with an informational
treatment in which the advocates themselves have only limited time to interact with
clients would be surprising. If, on the other hand, there is some population of clients
who would have been released in any case but become more compliant as a result of
their interactions with bail advocates, sorting need only account for a portion of the
large improvement in bail failures.
Perhaps the strongest evidence in favor of the behavioral change channel is the
fact that clients ultimately were less likely to receive outcomes that require
punishment or further monitoring (conviction or diversion and probation), with no
corresponding increase in other sanctions. Because of the quasi-random design,
clients with and without access to bail advocates should have similar levels of
underlying culpability for their offenses. Because exposure to a bail advocate does
not make an individual more or less “innocent,” the most plausible way it could
impact the ultimate case disposition is by changing how the defendant behaves
between arrest and disposition.
Case outcomes are determined not only by the underlying facts of the crimes and
how the prosecutor developed the evidence of those facts, but also by the quality of
evidence proffered by defense attorneys and how defendants present themselves
before the court. Many bail advocates’ actions are designed to build a relationship of
trust between the Defender Association and defendants. Defendants with more
trusting relationships with their attorneys may be more receptive to attorneys’
strategic advice, whereas those that distrust attorneys may use their own cultivated
expertise to navigate the adjudication process, which often results in more punitive
outcomes.152 Engaged defendants may also help the defense team mount a stronger
defense by, for example, encouraging reluctant witnesses to come forward.
Ethnographic work on sentencing further indicates that judges take into account
factors such as the defendant’s demeanor toward the court, employment situation,
and record of engaging in proactive corrective measures such as drug treatment or
counseling in deciding sentences.153 By allowing clients to feel heard and included
in the adjudication process, bail advocates can foster greater respect toward the court,
and advocates also work to connect clients with community resources and social
services predisposition that can further goals such as stable employment and

152. See Matthew Clair, Resources, Navigation, and Punishment in the Criminal Courts,
SOCARXIV (Oct. 26, 2018), https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/brf3d/ [https://perma.cc/9P9KT9SX].
153. See CASSIA C. SPOHN, HOW DO JUDGES DECIDE? THE SEARCH FOR FAIRNESS AND
JUSTICE IN PUNISHMENT 83–104 (2d ed. 2009); JEFFREY T. ULMER, SOCIAL WORLDS OF
SENTENCING: COURT COMMUNITIES UNDER SENTENCING GUIDELINES (1997).
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improved mental health. Thus, bail advocates encourage the very behaviors that have
been linked in past research to improved case outcomes.
To summarize, the interviews and supplementary empirical analyses provide
evidence in favor of two mechanisms of impact for the bail advocates. First, bail
advocates enable members of the court work group to better understand the risks of
nonappearance or future crime posed by particular defendants, permitting them to
sort and release those posing lesser risk. Second, bail advocates appear to help clients
feel more engaged with the adjudication process, which encourages behaviors that
contribute to better case outcomes.
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL POLICY
A. Sixth Amendment
The analysis above demonstrates that the quality of representation provided at the
preliminary arraignment directly affects the outcome of the case and the defendants’
likelihood of future involvement in the criminal justice system. These findings carry
implications for how we should understand Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
Under current caselaw, the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel does not
extend to all possible interactions between the State and criminal suspects but is
limited to so-called “critical stages” of the adjudication process.154 The Supreme
Court has indicated that critical stages exist “where counsel’s absence might derogate
from the accused's right to a fair trial”155 and to “pretrial procedures that would
impair defense on the merits if the accused is required to proceed without counsel.”156
Prior rulings suggest a mixed view of whether a bail setting specifically counts as
a critical stage. In Coleman v. Alabama, the Court extended the right to counsel to a
preliminary hearing which only concerned determining the sufficiency of evidence
against the accused and setting bail.157 Although noting the role of counsel in arguing
for bail,158 it centered its analysis on the necessity of counsel for cross-examining
witnesses and otherwise testing the State’s case, roles that have less valence in a bail
setting. In Gerstein v. Pugh, the Court specifically declined to extend the right to
counsel to the probable cause hearing, noting that the limited function and
nonadversarial character of the hearing differentiated it from the hearing in
Coleman.159 Other courts have similarly provided mixed indications regarding
whether the right to counsel extends to bail settings. While some early decisions
specifically exclude a bail setting as a critical stage,160 more recent rulings161 have
come to an opposite conclusion. For Philadelphia specifically, although public

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 223–28 (1967).
Id. at 226.
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122 (1975).
399 U.S. 1, 7–10 (1970).
Id. at 9.
420 U.S. at 122.
See cases cited supra note 17.
See cases cited supra note 16.
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defender representatives staff preliminary arraignments as a matter of custom, the
State has not formally designated this stage of the process as a critical stage.162
In Rothgery v. Gillespie County, the Court considered the right to counsel in a
pretrial setting very similar to the preliminary arraignments considered here.163
Shortly following arrest, criminal defendants in Texas are brought before a
magistrate judge for a hearing that combines a probable cause review with an initial
bail setting.164 In Rothgery, the Court ruled that the right to counsel “attaches” at this
proceeding—meaning that occurrence of the hearing obligates the State to appoint
counsel within a reasonable period of time.165 However, the Court did not go so far
as to indicate that counsel was required at the proceeding itself, leaving that issue
unresolved.166
The results here provide clear support for the notion that the early bail settings
should be considered a critical stage, and therefore fall under the Sixth Amendment’s
ambit. Whether a defendant has assistance from the defense team prior to and during
the preliminary arraignment measurably affects case outcomes, sentences, and
likelihood of further arrest. Defendants without bail advocates are less likely to be
acquitted or have their charges dismissed and more likely to receive probation. Thus,
requiring defendants to proceed without assistance of counsel prior to the bail hearing
demonstrably “impair[s] defense on the merits,” the very definition of a critical stage
proffered by the Court in Gerstein v. Pugh.167
Even accepting the above argument that bail represents a critical stage, the
existing process in Philadelphia without bail advocates could arguably pass Sixth
Amendment muster given that the Defender Association does represent all
individuals not otherwise represented during the bail hearing. However, beyond
justifying the presence of counsel, the findings here also suggest the possibility that
counsel, even if physically present, might not be constructively available if they are
not given adequate opportunity to confer with clients. Notably, because of the
experimental design, the same public defenders represent both categories of clients—
those that did and did not have access to a bail advocate. The difference in
performance thus arises solely due to the fact in one case the office had an
opportunity to meaningfully confer with the clients prior to the preliminary
arraignment, and in another, it did not. Under the restrictive criteria set forth in
United States v. Cronic168 for analyzing constructive denial of counsel, it seems
unlikely courts would find a Sixth Amendment violation based on this procedural
deficiency alone. Nevertheless, these results suggest that realizing the Constitution’s

162. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 122(A) (noting in commentary that counsel shall be appointed
“immediately after preliminary arraignment in all court cases”); see also Flora v. Luzerne
Cnty., 103 A.3d 125, 139 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014) (claiming that, in Pennsylvania, “the
defendant does not have a right to counsel to represent him at the preliminary arraignment”).
163. 544 U.S. 191 (2008).
164. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 15.17 (West 2017).
165. Rothgery, 544 U.S. at 203 (citing McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 180–81
(1991)).
166. Id. at 212–13.
167. 420 U.S. 103, 122 (1975).
168. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
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vision of fully effective counsel requires something more than mere presence in the
courtroom.
B. A Different Approach to Addressing Risk
Improving the quality of representation at first appearance can address core
objectives of both those who support risk assessment tools and those who oppose
them. At the same time, this approach seems unlikely to trigger many of the concerns
cited by opponents of ARAIs. Moreover, in most jurisdictions, enhanced defense can
be implemented within the confines of current court processes, meaning that there
may be less need to modify existing court procedures, pass new legislation, or secure
consensus of all the various criminal justice agencies involved in the pretrial
processing of defendants.
The fundamental premise behind ARAIs is that due to time constraints, cognitive
load, implicit or explicit bias, poor incentives, or other concerns, judges or their
agents are unable to make fully informed release decisions that maximize public
safety. ARAIs, it is thought, serve to inject different information in the process and
therefore allow those who make bail decisions to see some cases differently. As
demonstrated above, better defense counsel can serve a similar purpose.169 The
interviews and judge-specific analysis revealed that magistrates do in fact respond to
the information gathered by bail advocates. Moreover, ARAIs incorporate
predetermined information for all cases; however, the particular information that
would help magistrates make better decisions in marginal cases seems likely to vary
from defendant to defendant, meaning that a more flexible, defendant-specific
information gathering process may offer some advantages.
While fulfilling a key objective sought by ARAI proponents—enriching the
information set available to bail decisionmakers—improved defense counsel can also
simultaneously serve a core objective of ARAI opponents, that of enhancing
defendants’ access to supportive services during the pretrial period. The interviews
revealed that the enhanced time and attention provided by the bail advocates enabled
the Defender Association to more readily connect clients with services, such as drug
or mental health treatment, and also to engage families and the community in their
case. Ultimately, clients with better representation at the initial bail hearing are less
likely to be rearrested and less likely to be subjected to probation, meaning that they
become less entangled with the criminal justice system going forward.
Many concerns raised by opponents of ARAIs are not triggered by enhanced
representation. ARAI opponents cite several potential problems: reliance on
underlying data that is inaccurate or reflective of a biased system, lack of
transparency, racially disparate impact, and tools’ potential to widen the detention
net. Because defense counsel are not locked into using a rigid set of predictive factors
in evaluating their clients, they have the ability to adapt the information they collect
and present to the court, accounting for the unique characteristics of each case.

169. This finding is consistent with recent work demonstrating that holistic public
defenders can also enable judges to identify individuals who can be released without impairing
public safety. See James M. Anderson, Maya Buenaventura & Paul Heaton, The Effects of
Holistic Defense on Criminal Justice Outcomes, 132 HARV. L. REV. 819 (2019).
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Moreover, defense attorneys can help to address problems of biased or inaccurate
data by providing better contextual information to the court work group regarding
why a particular individual might have priors or other negative indicators in the
written record, something that ARAIs do not do.
A defense-focused intervention arguably also has the potential for greater
transparency than an ARAI. While the interactions between defense attorneys and
clients are obviously privileged and not transparent, any information collected by
defense attorneys that is to be used by a bail decisionmaker must be presented in
filings or in open court in a manner conforming to the public transparency
requirements of other court proceedings. In the case of Philadelphia’s bail advocates,
for example, the public can attend preliminary arraignments and other proceedings
where any information they develop would be presented to the court. This inclusion
of the work of defense attorneys as part of the court record contrasts with risk
assessment scores, which are generally not available to the public.170
Because of their structural role in the system, it is also less plausible to imagine
that enhanced defense services would increase racial disparity or lead to a widened
detention net. Defense attorneys are specifically tasked with advocating for the
narrow interests of their clients, so it seems unlikely that improving their capabilities
would lead to more detention. While in theory empowering defense attorneys could
exacerbate racial bias if defense counsel are themselves implicitly or explicitly
biased,171 our empirical analysis suggests that in fact the opposite is true—improving
defense representation in Philadelphia reduced racial disparities.
A further advantage of defense-focused reform is that it may be more politically
feasible to implement than an ARAI. Implementing an ARAI often requires
achieving consensus across a broad range of criminal justice agencies, including law
enforcement, pretrial services, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and courts, that a tool
would be valuable; enactment of enabling legislation or, at a minimum, changing
local court rules; and then developing, testing, and deploying the tool, along with
associated data collection required to allow the tool to operate. This complex process
involving a myriad of agencies and interests creates numerous veto points, and,
indeed, there are a number of prominent recent examples where plans to implement
ARAIs have been derailed by inability to achieve public and agency consensus.172
A defender-focused intervention, in contrast, could likely be implemented in
many jurisdictions with less requirement for consensus and less disturbance to

170. Of course, the internal mental processes of the defense team are not readily subject to
external examination in the way that algorithm might be if it were fully documented for the
public.
171. See Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Implicit Racial Attitudes of Death
Penalty Lawyers, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1539 (2004); L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff,
Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender Triage, 122 YALE L.J. 2626 (2013).
172. See Samantha Melamed, Pa. Officials Spent 8 Years Developing an Algorithm for
Sentencing. Now, Lawmakers Want to Scrap It, PHILA. INQUIRER (Dec. 12, 2018),
https://www.inquirer.com/news/risk-assessment-sentencing-pennsylvania--20181212.html
[https://perma.cc/C6SZ-YRB9]; Chad Sokol, After setbacks, Spokane County abandons
custom criminal justice algorithm in favor of simpler tool, SPOKESMAN-REV. (Feb. 20, 2019),
https://www.spokesman.com/stories/2019/jan/04/after-setbacks-spokane-county-abandonscustom-crim/ [https://perma.cc/6RYJ-ZPS7].
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existing rules and procedures. In jurisdictions where public defenders are already
involved in representing defendants at first appearance, the public defender office
could in theory unilaterally implement a reform like the bail advocates pilot by
increasing the number of personnel devoted to meeting with clients and staffing the
earliest bail hearings. In other jurisdictions, support of judges or jail authorities might
be required to modify procedures to ensure that attorneys have adequate opportunity
and space to meet with clients and that information obtained at these early meetings
could be presented to decisionmakers in a robust hearing. However, so long as a court
has some existing rules allowing for the participation of defense counsel in bail
hearings, there would be a basis under existing rules to accommodate a program like
that of the bail advocates.
Obviously, a further political hurdle would be securing appropriations for the
enhanced representation—a perennial challenge for underfunded indigent defense
systems.173 However, the problem of securing appropriations is not unique to
defender-focused interventions—it also exists for reforms involving ARAIs.
Moreover, one reason for legislators’ reluctance to fund indigent defense is because
they sometimes view such expenditures as potentially supporting criminals or being
soft on crime. This Article demonstrates, in contrast, that robust defense services do
not simply serve the narrow interests of criminal defendants but can be an important
tool to serve broader objectives of crime prevention and efficient administration of
justice.
Improving representation at first appearance is not incompatible with ARAIs—a
jurisdiction, if it so wishes, could pursue both reforms simultaneously. The
qualitative data suggest that better defense counsel may serve a similar information
processing role as an ARAI—in which case the two approaches might be
substitutes—but it is also at least possible that the two solutions together perform
better than either one alone. Moreover, it seems plausible to think that an ARAI may
function best in an environment where there is robust defense representation at first
appearance that can challenge and/or correct any data inputs to the ARAI which may
be faulty. The empirical results here ultimately do not speak to whether bail
advocates perform best in place of or in tandem with an ARAI, as there was no
variation in the use of risk assessments in Philadelphia during the time period in
question, but this could be an important issue to examine in future research.
C. Limitations
These results demonstrate that strengthening public defense at initial bail hearings
offers a promising avenue towards pretrial reform, but improved public defense
services are no panacea. Fully realizing the potential for enhanced defense services
to contribute to pretrial reform will require addressing a number of challenges.
First, even though the bail advocates program improved release outcomes, it did
not achieve one of the pilot’s primary goals: reducing pretrial incarceration. Even
though nearly all interviewees thought the presence of bail advocates would lead to
more pretrial releases, this did not occur. As discussed above, there are a variety of

173. See Eve Brensike Primus, Defense Counsel and Public Defense, in 3 REFORMING
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCESSES 121 (Erik Luna ed., 2017).
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potential explanations for this pattern, but one plausible explanation—likely not
unique to Philadelphia—is that an intervention focused on one component of the
pretrial system induces compensatory responses by other actors so that the system
tends towards homeostasis.174 Given that the bail advocates did reduce FTA and
pretrial rearrest, the program did furnish a strong foundation for further reductions in
the pretrial population, as any mechanical increases in FTA or crime stemming from
releasing more defendants could presumably be partly or even fully offset with
higher quality defense services. Nevertheless, these results suggest that defensefocused interventions may be insufficient on their own to reduce incarceration rates
absent other decarceration initiatives.
Another difficulty arises due to the different scalability and cost structures of
defender-focused interventions as compared to ARAIs. ARAIs can require a
substantial upfront investment to develop tools, build the necessary data collection
infrastructure to support the tools, implement the tools, and train decisionmakers
regarding their use. However, after these initial costs are realized, the tools can be
extended to essentially all criminal defendants at low marginal cost, and such low
marginal costs persist until the tools need to be recalibrated. Thus, one appealing
feature of ARAIs is that they can be applied to new and growing criminal justice
populations without substantial new appropriations. Defender-centric solutions such
as the bail advocates, in contrast, require hiring of additional personnel and the
ongoing costs associated with maintaining a labor pool; moreover, other than modest
economies that might be gained through consolidating training or administrative
support, costs for these programs will likely scale in proportion to the number of
defendants served. This linear scaling of costs is a particular drawback for a program
like that of the bail advocates, which may decrease in marginal effectiveness as it
scales to encompass defendants for whom bail advocate services are less
beneficial.175
Finally, questions remain regarding the generalizability of these findings. The
analysis presented here, while providing high quality causal evidence due to the
quasi-random research design, is specific to a particular jurisdiction and time period.
Philadelphia’s current pretrial process has particular problems—such as the poor
access of defendants to lawyers or family members while in pretrial detention and
the lack of communication with defendants about how the pretrial process works—
that may not be shared by all jurisdictions. Whether these findings would generalize
to other jurisdictions where defense counsel play either no role or a limited one in
initial bail hearings remains uncertain, and impacts likely depend on factors such as
the nature and quality of the pretrial services interview or the degree of
individualization in the hearing that vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. While not
all jurisdictions might benefit from bail advocates to the extent shown here for

174. Other work has demonstrated a similar tendency towards homeostasis following the
introduction of ARAIs—for example, see Sloan et al., supra note 42; Stevenson, supra note
42.
175. Because they could not represent every defendant in a shift, the advocates focused on
defendants who they believed would benefit most from an interview. Interview with Bail
Advoc. #1, supra note 90; Interview with Bail Advoc. #2, supra note 90. Thus, clients who
did not end up getting advocates may be less responsive to the intervention than those who
participated in the pilot.
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Philadelphia, it is also possible that enhancing the quality of defense counsel may be
even more effective in some jurisdictions—after all, prior to the bail advocates pilot,
there were at least Defender Association personnel at the hearings.
The bail advocate approach also may not fully generalize because some criminal
defendants hire private counsel, and not all indigent defendants are represented by
institutional providers such as public defenders. Defender-focused interventions
cannot reach the universe of defendants in a manner achievable for some other
interventions, like ARAIs or court reminders. Identifying ways to extend the benefits
of robust representation at first appearance to all criminal defendants, regardless of
the mode of providing indigent defense services, represents an important opportunity
for further refinement and improvement of the model studied here.
CONCLUSION
Consider the following thought experiment: suppose the city of Philadelphia had
been able to provide bail advocates to all 31,000 people arraigned in 2018. Further
assume conservatively that, when calculated across this overall population of
individuals accused of crime, the effects of bail advocates are only one-fourth as
large as those shown in this Article. Based on the estimates above, bail advocates
would have enabled roughly 600 individuals to escape the punishment and
sometimes monitoring associated with conviction or diversion. A further 600 who
faced a probation tail following their sentence would have been able to convince the
court otherwise. Two hundred and fifty Black individuals who would have been
detained under the status quo system in which disparities grow as the process
advances would have secured release, while 350 people who would have had their
bail revoked or forfeited due to FTA or additional crimes would have avoided these
outcomes. Over the next eighteen months, the city would have prevented nearly 2000
further arrests involving this cohort of individuals.
What do such numbers tell us more broadly about pretrial reform? In Philadelphia,
as in many other jurisdictions, initial bail decisions are made quickly and with limited
opportunity for an individualized consideration of defendant risk and needs.
Magistrates proceed based on sparse information. Minorities accused of crimes bear
the brunt of these decisions and become even more disproportionately represented in
the system once bail is set. Bail violations and rearrest occur regularly. Defendants’
expectations for how they will interact with their lawyers and the court are
established in a hearing where they have no voice, and prior to which their attorneys
have never spoken with them. The experience is bewildering, frustrating, and
alienating for many.
Some reformers claim we can best improve this situation by providing magistrates
with better information, while others emphasize giving those accused of crimes better
resources for successful compliance during the pretrial period. On the information
side, actuarial risk assessments have become a widely embraced solution, but this is
not the only way to improve decisionmakers’ information set. And ARAIs do little
to directly encourage compliance.
This Article identifies a solution that can serve the information-enhancing goals
of those advocating for ARAIs, while also directly helping people accused of crimes
to avoid future violations. The experimental evidence is encouraging—enabling
defense attorneys to better engage with their clients early on in the process improves
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information available to magistrates. It fosters better engagement with the courts.
These changes ultimately translate into fewer bail violations, less punitive
punishments, and fewer arrests. And these impacts occur in a manner that reduces
racial disparities. More so than new algorithms, the path forward to effective pretrial
reform may require elevating an old mainstay of the criminal process—the defense
attorney.
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Appendix Table 1: Regressions Examining Exogeneity of Instrument
Explanatory Variable
Male
Black
Other race (nonwhite)
Age
# felony charges in current case
# misd. charges in current case
Violent offense
Drug offense

I
-0.0002
(0.0019)
-0.0001
(0.0016)
-0.0021
(0.0048)
-3.39E-05
(0.0001)
0.0000
(0.0002)
-0.0011*
(0.0004)
0.0009
(0.0020)
0.0012
(0.0019)

II
-0.0008
(0.0020)
-0.0002
(0.0016)
-0.0010
(0.0050)
-7.23E-05
(0.0001)
0.0000
(0.0002)
-0.0010*
(0.0004)
0.0014
(0.0021)
0.0012
(0.0020)
0.0024
(0.0061)
0.0048
(0.0031)
0.0045*
(0.0022)
0.0000
(0.0002)
0.0003*
(0.0002)
-0.0002
(0.0002)
-0.0015
(0.0010)

98,874
0.462

92,455
0.219

Zip code poverty rate
Represented by appointed counsel
Represented by public defender
# prior arrests
# prior felony convictions
# prior misd. convictions
# prior bail failures
N
F-Test P-value

Note: This table reports coefficient estimates from linear regressions of an indicator for
whether a particular defendant was arraigned in a shift during which bail advocates were taking
cases on the indicated covariates and a set of hour by day of week and week fixed effects (not
shown in table). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Each column reports
results for a separate regression; the sample size is lower in column II because zip code and
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prior criminal history information were unavailable for some observations. The reported Ftests test the joint null hypothesis of no relationship for all covariates listed in the table.

Appendix Table 2: First Stage IV Results
Explanatory Variable
Appeared on a shift where advocates taking cases
F-Statistic on Instrument

Limited
Controls
0.184**

Full
Controls
0.185**

(0.004)

(0.004)

1684.6

1732.9

Include week and hour by day of week fixed effects?
Y
Y
Control for defendant and case characteristics and prior
N
Y
criminal history?
Note: This table reports coefficient estimates from the first stage IV regressions. The unit of
observation is a case, and the outcome is an indicator for whether a bail advocate worked with
the defendant in the case. The instrument is an indicator for whether the preliminary
arraignment occurred during a shift in which bail advocates were taking cases. The “Limited
Controls” column includes a full set of hour by day of week and week fixed effects (not shown
in table) as additional controls; the “Full Controls” adds all controls used in Table 3. Standard
errors clustered on arraignment date are reported in parentheses. Each column reports results
for a separate regression; the sample size is 99,086. ** denotes an estimate that is statistically
significant at the 1% level.

Appendix Table 3: Robustness Checks
Specification
1. Baseline
(N=98,916)
2. Limited controls
(N=99,086)

Detained
-0.014
(0.032)

Any bail
violation
-0.045*
(0.020)

# future
arrests
-0.254*
(0.123)

Any
guilty
-0.079*
(0.040)

Probation
sentence
-0.073⁺
(0.039)

Jail
sentence
0.006
(0.029)

-0.060
(0.044)

-0.048*
(0.021)

-0.188
(0.129)

-0.037
(0.044)

-0.058
(0.043)

0.011
(0.033)

3. Limit sample to Apr. 2017Mar. 2019
(N=66,206)

-0.039

-0.038⁺

-0.233⁺

-0.117*

-0.115*

-0.034

(0.036)

(0.022)

(0.129)

(0.049)

(0.045)

(0.034)

4. Omit attorney controls
(N=98,916)

-0.013
(0.032)

-0.044*
(0.020)

-0.250*
(0.123)

-0.077⁺
(0.040)

-0.071⁺
(0.039)

0.008
(0.029)

5. Matching estimator
(N=87,142)

-0.038
(0.049)

-0.033
(0.027)

-0.392**
(0.137)

-0.103⁺
(0.061)

-0.048
(0.060)

0.054
(0.044)

6. Include expunged cases
(N=101,874)

-0.015
(0.031)

-0.042*
(0.019)

-0.268*
(0.120)

-0.065⁺
(0.038)

-0.073*
(0.037)

0.005
(0.028)

7. Non-experimental estimates
(N=98,916)

-0.021*
(0.008)

0.003
(0.006)

0.014
(0.026)

-0.019
(0.014)

-0.002
(0.013)

-0.007
(0.008)
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Note: See notes for Table 3. The “Limited Controls” specification includes only week and day
of week by hour fixed effects as controls. The “Matching Estimator” specification is described
in the main text of the paper. “Non-experimental estimates” were obtained via ordinary least
square regression with controls as specified for Table 3.

Appendix Table 4: Randomization Inference

Outcome
Detained
Any bail violation
# future arrests
Any guilty
Probation sentence
Jail sentence

Estimated
Effect of Bail
Advocates
-0.014
-0.045
-0.254
-0.079
-0.073
0.006

Fraction of
Simulated
Coefficients Less
Than Estimate
16.3%
3.9%
5.6%
0.6%
0.5%
15.0%

Appendix Table 5: Estimated Effects for Population Subgroups

Effect of bail advocate for
defendants that are:
Black
Non-black
P-value from H0: Black=Non-black
Male
Female
P-value from H0: Male=Female
No prior convictions
Prior convictions

Detained
-0.051

Outcome:
Bail
violation
-0.029

# future
arrests
-0.268*

(0.042)

(0.024)

(0.134)

0.041

-0.050⁺

-0.286*

(0.038)

(0.026)

(0.144)

0.056

0.463

0.884

-0.015

-0.054*

-0.401*

(0.044)

(0.026)

(0.159)

-0.013

-0.028⁺

0.028

(0.024)

(0.017)

(0.086)

0.980

0.338

0.002

-0.022

-0.048*

-0.338*

(0.040)

(0.023)

(0.151)

-0.003

-0.040⁺

-0.131

(0.037)

(0.024)

(0.124)

P-value from H0: Priors=No Priors
0.669
0.771
0.141
Note: This table reports coefficients from IV specifications similar to those estimated in Table
3, but which include interaction terms allowing the effects of having a bail advocate to vary
according to the characteristic indicated. The specifications for race, gender, and prior
convictions are estimated separately. See notes for Table 3.

